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Essay
MOHAMMED JAWAD AND THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS OF GUANTÁNAMO
DAVID J. R. FRAKT†
INTRODUCTION
A. A Brief Summary of Mohammed Jawad’s Detention
On December 17, 2002, Mohammed Jawad, then about fourteen
1
or fifteen years old, was arrested by Afghan police on suspicion of
involvement in a single grenade attack on a U.S. military jeep in a
crowded public bazaar in Kabul. The attack injured two U.S. service
2
members and their local interpreter. According to news accounts and
3
public statements by senior Afghan officials, multiple persons were
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General’s Corps Reserve. He served as a defense counsel in the Office of Military Commissions
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1. Jawad does not know his birth date, so it is unknown how old he was at the time of his
arrest. Reports from Afghan officials suggest he may have been as young as twelve, while the
U.S. government claims he was seventeen. Mohammed Jawad, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/military-commissions/cases/mohammedjawad (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
2. E.g., Waheedullah Massoud, Five Held Over Rare Attack on U.S. Troops in Kabul,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 18, 2002, available at Factiva, Doc. No. afpr
000020021218dyci005pn; Stephane Orjollet, Two US Troops, Translator Wounded in Grenade
Attack in Kabul, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 17, 2002, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
afpr000020021218dych00020; Todd Pitman, Two US Soldiers and Interpreter Hurt in
Afghanistan Grenade Attack, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/asia/two-us-soldiers-and-interpreter-hurt-in-afghanistan-grenade-attack-611329.html;
Amin Tarzi, Al-Qaeda Blamed for Attack on U.S. Soldiers in Kabul, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO
LIBERTY (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142823.html; US Troops Hurt in
Kabul Attack, BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2002, 18:46 PM GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/2583947.stm; Amin Tarzi, Perpetrators of Attacks Against U.S. Troops in Kabul
Arrested, News, Afghan Report: December 20, 2002, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (Dec.
20, 2002), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1340650.html.
3. US Troops Hurt in Kabul Attack, supra note 2 (quoting Basir Salangi, Head, Kabul
Police).
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arrested for and confessed to this crime. But Jawad was the only
suspect handed over to U.S. authorities. Before turning him over,
Afghan officials threatened to kill Jawad or a member of his family if
4
he did not confess. The police then forced him to place his
thumbprint on a confession they had written. Jawad was illiterate, and
5
the document was in Dari, a language he did not even speak.
Jawad was taken to a U.S. base on the outskirts of Kabul, where
he was stripped naked, photographed, and then subjected to a highly
6
coercive interrogation, which started near midnight and lasted well
into the morning. Although he initially denied throwing the hand
7
grenade, the interrogators eventually extracted another “confession.”
This second confession provided a completely different version of the
grenade attack and the events leading up to it than the confession
prepared by the Afghan police. These two conflicting coerced
statements eventually formed the centerpiece of the prosecution’s
case.
Later that morning, Jawad was transported to Bagram Prison.
Over the next forty-nine days, he underwent brutal treatment and at
least eleven abusive interrogations by U.S. personnel who beat him,
forced him into so-called stress positions, forcibly hooded him, placed
him in physical and linguistic isolation, pushed him down stairs,
chained him to a wall for prolonged periods, and threatened to kill
8
him. U.S. forces also subjected the terrified teenager to sleep
deprivation, and “interrogators’ notes indicate that [he] was so
disoriented at one point that he did not know whether it was day or
night. [He] was also frightened, intimidated and deeply disturbed by
4. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 349, 349 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Nov. 19, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements by the Accused
Made While in U.S. Custody (D-021)).
5. Daphne Eviatar, Military Lawyer Claims U.S. Paid Gitmo Prosecution Witnesses,
WASH. INDEP. (Aug. 4, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/53655/gitmodetainee-claims-u-s-paid-prosecution-witnesses.
6. For the unclassified details about the interrogation, see Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Mohammed Jawad (Also Known as Saki Bacha) at 10–11, Al
Halmandy v. Bush, No. 05-cv-2385 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
natsec/amended_jawad_20090113.pdf.
7. Unfortunately, the videotape of this interrogation—which would have resolved
disputed claims about the nature and level of coercion used and the content of the alleged
confession—was lost. Id. Ex. B at 9.
8. In all, Jawad was interrogated over fifty times from 2002 to 2006. After his first twelve
hours in captivity, he consistently denied throwing the hand grenade. Amended Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Mohammed Jawad (Also Known as Saki Bacha), supra
note 6, at 11.
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the sounds of screams from other prisoners and rumors of other
9
prisoners being beaten to death.”
In early February 2003, Jawad was transferred to the U.S.
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Over the next several
years, he was the victim of more inhumane treatment, arguably rising
10
to the level of torture. This maltreatment included repeated periods
of physical and linguistic isolation designed to make Jawad
completely dependent on his interrogators, to break his will, and to
devastate him emotionally. On this final score, the program
succeeded: according to official prison logs, he tried to commit suicide
on December 25, 2003. In May 2004, Jawad was subjected to
Guantánamo’s notorious sleep deprivation program, “euphemistically
11
referred to as the ‘frequent flyer’ program.” In October 2004, a
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) determined Jawad to be
an enemy combatant and recommended his continued indefinite
12
detention. Under the rules of the CSRT, Jawad was not represented
13
by counsel at this hearing. It would be another three years before he
14
had the opportunity to talk to a lawyer.
9. Id. at 11–12; see also id. at 11 (“Just days before [Jawad] arrived at Bagram, on
December 4 and 10, 2002, two detainees held there were beaten to death by U.S. Forces.”
(citing Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2005, at A1)).
10. See United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 334, 336 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Sept. 24, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Torture of the Detainee (D-008))
(finding that the use of the “frequent flyer” program against Jawad was “abusive conduct and
cruel and inhuman treatment,” but declining to decide whether it rose to the level of torture);
Defense Motion to Dismiss Based on Torture of Detainee Pursuant to R.M.C. 907 (D-008) at
17, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 28, 2008) (“[A]
suicidal teenager, brought to Guantanamo while still a minor, was subjected to a flagrant
violation of international and domestic law—tortured by U.S. officials while in U.S. custody as
an enemy combatant.”); see also Amnesty Int’l, United States of America: From Ill-Treatment to
Unfair Trial, the Case of Mohammed Jawad, Child ‘Enemy Combatant,’ at 2, AI Index: AMR
51/091/2008 (Aug. 13, 2008) (“Whatever the reason for [Jawad’s] subjection to the frequent flyer
program . . . its use violated the international prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.”). Because citations to Military Commissions cases require
a unique format, this Essay includes full citations to them unless a shortened form is
unambiguous.
11. Jawad, 1 M.C. at 334.
12. Mohammed Jawad, supra note 1; see also Memorandum from the Office for the Admin.
Review of the Det. of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Dep’t of
Def., to Mohamed Jawad 1–2 (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo/detainees/900-mohamed-jawad#8 (identifying factors favoring Jawad’s continued
detention).
13. See David J.R. Frakt, An Indelicate Imbalance: A Critical Comparison of the Rules and
Procedures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 335 (2007)
(outlining the rules for counsel appointed in detainee cases); Memorandum from the Deputy
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Charges were sworn against Jawad on October 9, 2007. He was
the fourth detainee to be charged under the Military Commissions
16
Act of 2006 (MCA)—after David Hicks, Salim Hamdan, and Omar
17
Khadr. He was charged with three counts each of two different
crimes—“Attempted Murder in Violation of the Law of War” and
18
“Intentionally Causing Serious Bodily Injury” —stemming from his
alleged throwing of the hand grenade on December 17, 2002. After a
19
cursory legal review, the charges were referred by the Convening
20
Authority on January 30, 2008 to trial by military commission. At his
arraignment, Jawad told the judge that he did not want to be
21
represented by his assigned counsel or any other military lawyer.

Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy, Enclosure (1), § C(3) (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf (describing the “personal
representative” offered to a detainee instead of a lawyer at the CSRT).
14. Pursuant to Rule for Military Commissions 502(d)(6), a military defense counsel was
detailed to represent Jawad after charges were sworn against him in October 2007. U.S.
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. II, R.M.C. 502(d)(6), at II-23 (2007). This initial counsel
was excused in March 2008, and I replaced him the next month.
15. Charge Sheet of Mohammed Jawad, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2007/Jawad
Charge Sheet.pdf.
16. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
17. David J.R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture of Mohammed
Jawad, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 3 (2009).
18. Charge Sheet of Mohammed Jawad, supra note 15, at 3–4. The military commission
judge later dismissed this second charge on the basis that it was a lesser included offense of the
attempted murder charges.
19. The legal advisor to the Convening Authority for Military Commissions prepared a
brief three pages of legal analysis prior to Jawad’s charges being referred. Defense Motion to
Dismiss for Unlawful Influence (D-004), Attachment 3, at 1–3, United States v. Jawad (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 20, 2008) (on file with the author). Unfortunately, when
this motion was publicly released, the entire attachment was redacted by the Department of
Defense (DOD). See Defense Motion to Dismiss for Unlawful Influence, supra, Attachment 3,
at 1–4, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jawad - D - 004 Motion to Dismiss Unlawful
Influence 2.pdf.
20. Charge Sheet of Mohammed Jawad, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2008/
d20080130jawadcharge.pdf.
21. Record of Trial at 19–20, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba Mar. 12, 2008). This record of trial has not been publicly released, but the relevant portion
of the transcript was published. David J.R. Frakt, The Difficulty of Defending Detainees, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 381, 387–88 (2009).
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In February 2008, I volunteered and was selected to serve as a
22
military defense counsel for the commissions. On April 28, 2008, I
reported for duty and was assigned to represent Jawad, taking over
the case from his first counsel, who had just completed his tour of
duty and returned to his civilian job. At the time, Jawad was virtually
unknown. The first news article about Jawad reflected as much,
23
referring to him as “The Forgotten Kid of Guantánamo.” Within
months, Jawad became the poster child for closing Guantánamo and
ending the military commissions. Amnesty International devoted a
24
seventy-page report to his case. A New York Times editorial
described it as “emblematic of everything that is wrong with
25
Guantánamo Bay.” Two other New York Times op-eds openly
26
called for his release. By November 2008, the case against Jawad had
disintegrated: the lead prosecutor had resigned, and the military
judge had suppressed the government’s primary evidence and
27
rejected its entire theory of the crime. Until the charges were
dismissed on July 31, 2009 and he was sent home, Jawad’s case
continued to be a thorn in the side of both the outgoing and incoming
administrations—a potent symbol of the unfinished business of the
Guantánamo detainees.
B. From Initial Appearance to Release
Within hours of my arrival at the Office of Military
Commissions, the military judge was informed that I was taking over
the case. The judge ordered a hearing for May 7, 2008, and I
immediately flew to Guantánamo. Over the next week, I met with
22. I served active duty as an Air Force Judge Advocate General (JAG) from 1995 to 2005.
In 2005, I transferred to the Air Force Reserves and began a new career as a law professor.
23. Stacy Sullivan, The Forgotten Kid of Guantánamo, SALON (May 27, 2008, 7:00 AM),
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/05/27/gitmo_jawad/index.html.
24. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 10, at 4 (providing an official summary of the report’s
findings).
25. Editorial, The Price of Our Good Name, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at WK8.
26. Bob Herbert, How Long Is Long Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A21;
Editorial, Justice Too Long Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at A20.
27. Eric Umansky, Gitmo Tribunal: Things Fall Apart, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 29, 2008, 11:40
AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/gitmo-tribunal-things-fall-apart-1029. The federal judge
assigned to the habeas corpus petition, Ellen Segal Huvelle, pointedly reminded the
Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys that “we’re getting to about a nine month mark where
you’ve already known that your evidence is in serious trouble” and chastised them for “dragging
this out for no good reason” after the “case fell apart.” Transcript of Hearing at 16, 21, Bacha v.
Obama, No. 05-2384 (D.D.C. July 16, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
safefree/jawad_transcriptofhearing.pdf.
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Jawad several times. With the help of my Pashto interpreter, I built
up enough trust and rapport with him that he agreed to allow me to
represent him, at least on a limited basis. The scope of my
representation was restricted to “challenging the legitimacy and
legality” of the military commissions and the conditions of Jawad’s
28
confinement.
29
Over the summer, my defense team filed dozens of motions.
Several of the motions related to discovery, witness, and funding
requests, but most were motions to dismiss the charges or suppress
30
evidence. We litigated many of these motions in three separate
31
32
hearings held on June 19, August 13–14, and September 25–26,
33
2008.

28. Transcript at 61, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
May 7, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
29. Initially, I was the sole defense counsel assigned. After the June 19, 2008 hearing, Navy
Lieutenant Commander Katharine Doxakis was assigned as assistant defense counsel. After the
August 13–14 hearing, Marine Corps Major Eric Montalvo was added to the team.
30. Many, but by no means all, of the motions are available on the Department of Defense
Military Commissions website, on the Mohammed Jawad page. Military Commissions:
Mohammed Jawad, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://www.defense.gov/news/commissions
Jawad.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2011).
31. See Ben Fox, Guantanamo Detainee Tells Military Court He Was Subjected to Sleep
Deprivation, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2008, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
APRS000020080619e46j00bcx (describing Jawad’s testimony at a June 19 hearing, during which
he accused guards of conducting a two-week-long sleep deprivation program on him); Jane
Sutton, Guantanamo Prisoner Cites 2-Week Sleep Deprivation, REUTERS (June 19, 2008, 10:15
PM BST), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1936906020080619 (same); Jane Sutton, Judge
Urged to Drop Guantanamo Charge, REUTERS (June 20, 2008, 5:52 AM BST),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1946929420080620 (same); see also Jo Becker, The War on
Teen Terror, SALON (June 24, 2008, 08:15 AM ET), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/
06/24/juveniles_at_gitmo/index.html (describing Jawad’s testimony, but in the broader context
of juveniles at the detention camp in Guantánamo).
32. See Mike Melia, Adviser to Guantanamo Trials Faces More Criticism, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 13, 2008 [hereinafter Melia, Adviser to Guantanamo Trials], available at
NewsBank, Rec. No. D92HMRB82 (discussing the August 13 hearing at which Jawad’s defense
team argued for the legal advisor to the tribunal to be removed from the case on the ground of
improper interference); Mike Melia, Pentagon Official Removed from 2nd Gitmo Trial,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 14, 2008 [hereinafter Melia, Pentagon Official Removed], available at
NewsBank, Rec. No. D92I82501 (recounting that day’s hearing, during which a military judge
ordered the legal advisor removed from Jawad’s case because he had compromised his
objectivity); Jane Sutton, U.S. General Barred from Another Guantanamo Trial, REUTERS
(Aug. 14, 2008, 04:10 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1337894520080814
(same); see also Nicole Barrett, The GTMO “Incentive Program,” ACSBLOG (Aug. 19, 2008,
3:13 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/12603 (reporting the military’s defense of the
frequent flyer program during testimony at Jawad’s August hearing in Guantánamo); Jennifer
Turner, Allegations of Torture of Two Teen Detainees at Guantánamo, DAILY KOS (Aug. 14,
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Although none of our many motions to dismiss the attempted
murder charges were granted, our motions to suppress were
successful. In two rulings issued in October and November of 2008,
the military judge, Army Colonel Stephen Henley, suppressed all
34
confessions to the Afghan police made on December 17, 2002 and
any confessions made to U.S. personnel later that night and the next
35
morning. The government filed an interlocutory appeal of the
second ruling to the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR).
The appeal suspended all other activity in the case, which was
scheduled to go to trial in January 2009. I argued the appeal on
January 13, 2009, but the CMCR never got the chance to rule because
President Obama ordered a suspension of all military commission
36
cases the following week. The government asked the court to stay
the issuance of its opinion for 120 days while the new administration
worked out its detention policies. Over our objection, the stay was
37
granted and later extended another 120 days. While the military
commission was suspended, the Jawad defense team, with the aid of
the American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) National Security
Project, pursued a habeas corpus petition in U.S. District Court in

2008, 12:32 PM PST), http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/8/14/151057/877/558/567963
(same).
33. See Mike Melia, Former Gitmo Prosecutor Blasts Tribunals, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept.
27, 2008 [hereinafter Melia, Former Gitmo Prosecutor Blasts Tribunals], available at NewsBank,
Rec. No. D93ENVE80 (explaining that a U.S. military prosecutor quit, alleging at a September
25 hearing that his superiors withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in Jawad’s case); Mike
Melia, Gitmo Prosecutor Seeks Immunity for Testimony, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 25, 2008,
available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D93E2BG80 (same); Mike Melia, Guantanamo Prosecutor
Quits over Detainee Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 25, 2008 [hereinafter Melia, Guantanamo
Prosecutor Quits], available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D93DH2AG0 (same).
34. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 345, 346 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 28, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements of the Accused
to Afghan Authorities (D-022)).
35. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 349, 351 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Nov. 19, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements by the Accused
Made While in U.S. Custody (D-021)).
36. William Glaberson, Obama Orders Halt to Prosecutions at Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/washington/22gitmo.html.
37. Government Motion for Additional Stay of Decision, United States v. Jawad, No. 08004 (Ct. Military Comm’n Rev. Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 15, 2009), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/JAWAD Government Motion for Additional Stay of Decision (15
May 2009) (11 pages) pdf .pdf; see also Appellee Response to Government Motion for
Additional Stay of Decision, United States v. Jawad, No. 08-004 (Ct. Military Comm’n Rev.
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 19, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/JAWAD 08004 Appellee Response to Government Motion for Additional Stay (18 May 2009) (14
pages).pdf.
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39

D.C. On April 22, 2009, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle rejected the
40
government’s motion for a stay and ordered the prosecution to
41
respond on the merits.
To our surprise, and the judge’s stated dismay, the government
indicated that it would rely on the very same confessions that had
been suppressed in the military commissions as the basis for detaining
Jawad as an enemy combatant. We filed a motion to suppress all of
42
the statements Jawad had made in Afghan or U.S. custody. On July
15, 2009, the government abandoned its reliance on these statements
and informed the court that it would not oppose our motion to
suppress. The next day, at a status hearing, in a judicial scolding that
made the front page of the New York Times, Judge Huvelle
43
excoriated the government for its handling of the case. She granted
44
the suppression motion, ruling that all of Jawad’s statements were
the product of torture and leaving the government with almost no
evidence with which to prove that there was a lawful basis to detain
Jawad. In Judge Huvelle’s words, “The case, without the statements,
45
has been gutted.” Nevertheless, Judge Huvelle offered the
government the opportunity to justify Jawad’s detention, ordering a
hearing on the merits for August 5, 2009. She gave the prosecution

38. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on Behalf of Mohammed Jawad (Also
Known as Saki Bacha), supra note 6.
39. Al Halmandy v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) (order denying
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petitions Without Prejudice or, Alternatively, to Hold
Petitions in Abeyance Pending Completion of Military Commission Proceedings), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/alhalmandyvobama_order.pdf. The spelling of Al
Halmandy’s name varies among different court documents; those spellings are preserved here.
40. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Habeas Petitions Without Prejudice or, Alternatively,
to Hold Petitions in Abeyance Pending Completion of Military Commission Proceedings, Al
Hamandy v. Bush, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/images/asset_upload_file88_38719.pdf.
41. Al Halmandy v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46–48 (D.D.C. 2009) (order amending the
Case Management Order).
42. Petitioner Mohammed Jawad’s Motion to Suppress his Out-of-Court Statements, AlHamdandy v. Obama, No. 05-2385 (D.D.C. July 1, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/safefree/jawad_motiontosuppress.pdf.
43. William Glaberson, U.S. Judge Challenges Evidence on a Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2009, at A22. The New York Times published the full transcript of the hearing, highlighting the
judge’s stinging criticism of the government’s case. See Jawad’s Hearing in Federal District
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2009), http://documents.nytimes.com/jawad-s-hearing-in-federaldistrict-court#p=1 (reproducing Transcript of Hearing, supra note 27).
44. Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2149949, at *1 (D.D.C. July 17, 2009) (order
granting Jawad’s motion to suppress).
45. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 27, at 6.
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until July 24, 2009, to file an amended statement of facts. On the due
date, the government filed a notice informing the court that it was
dropping its opposition to the habeas petition and no longer
46
considered Jawad legally detainable.
On July 30, 2009, Judge Huvelle granted the writ of habeas
corpus and ordered Jawad’s release on or immediately after August
47
21, 2009. Later that day, I sent a formal demand to dismiss the
military commission charges to the Convening Authority, arguing
that the government’s concession that Jawad was not lawfully
detained at Guantánamo deprived the commission of jurisdiction; the
48
next day, the Convening Authority dismissed the charges. On
August 22, 2009, Jawad departed Guantánamo for Afghanistan,
where, on August 24, he was released to his family.
FIVE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE JAWAD CASE
Jawad’s story and the collapse of the case against him is a
microcosm of the problems that have bedeviled Guantánamo, and it
exposed many troubling and controversial aspects of the military
commissions. In this Part, I explore five of the most significant aspects
of his case. First, Jawad was a child soldier charged with a novel war
crime based on an unsupported legal theory. His case therefore
demonstrated the Bush administration’s abandonment of the law of
war. Second, because it rested largely on statements obtained through
coercive interrogations, Jawad’s case revealed the extent to which the
success of the commissions hinged on the prosecution’s ability to
introduce unreliable, involuntary confessions. Third, the case
revealed the prosecution to be dysfunctional and deeply divided.
Fourth, the case laid bare the prevalence and nature of detainee
abuse at Bagram and Guantánamo with a well-publicized motion to
dismiss the charges based on torture by U.S. personnel. Finally,
although all of these factors contributed to the unraveling of the
prosecution, the case ultimately foundered because Jawad had

46. Notice that Respondents Will No Longer Treat Petitioner as Detainable Under the
AUMF and Request for Appropriately Tailored Relief, Al Hamandy v. Obama, No. 05-cv-2385
(D.D.C. July 24, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/alhalmandyvobama_
govtfiling.pdf.
47. Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846, at *1 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009) (order
granting Jawad’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
48. Letter from Susan J. Crawford, Convening Auth. for Military Comm’ns (July 31, 2009),
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Direction of CA - Jawad 31 JUL 2009.pdf
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something in common with the vast majority of his fellow
Guantánamo detainees: he was not a terrorist.
The truths exposed by the Jawad case en route to this conclusion
undermined the legitimacy of the military commissions and provided
powerful arguments for dramatically reforming them, if not
abandoning them altogether. As troubling as the problems that
emerged in the Jawad case were, it is perhaps more troubling that
they were not unique to his case. Each of the major issues that
emerged in his case has arisen in other cases before the military
commissions. Thus, it is my hope that a close examination of his case
will shed light on some of the systemic problems at Guantánamo.
A. Invented War Crimes for Invented War Criminals
One of the oft-repeated justifications for the use of military
commissions was that the detainees were not ordinary criminals but
rather war criminals. Perhaps because very few of the detainees being
held at Guantánamo had actually committed any traditional war
49
crimes, the original military commissions created by executive order
of President George W. Bush included several offenses previously
unknown to the law of war. These offenses essentially criminalized
being an enemy, as proven by actual fighting—such as killing or
attempting to kill or seriously injure U.S. or coalition forces, or
destroying or attempting to destroy military property—or by
providing “material support” to our enemies, which included
50
51
attending training, preparing to fight, cooking, driving, and creating
52
Despite their dubious origins, these novel
propaganda videos.
offenses were codified into law in the Military Commissions Act of
2006. The Jawad case starkly exposed that the military commissions
were not true war crimes tribunals based on the law of war, contrary
to the rhetoric of the administration.

49. See infra notes 204–10 and accompanying text.
50. Charge Sheet of Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud Al Qosi, United States v. Al Qosi (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20080305alqosicharges.pdf.
51. Id.; Charge Sheet of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, United States v. Hamdan (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/1 AE
001-025 Redacted.pdf.
52. Charge Sheet of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, United States v. al Bahlul
(Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/AE 1-13.pdf.
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1. The State of the Law and the Changes Made by the Bush
Administration. According to the Bush administration, there were no
53
lawful combatants opposing us in the Afghan conflict. Thus, neither
al Qaeda nor Taliban fighters were entitled to prisoner of war status.
Indeed, President Bush went one step further and declared that they
were not lawfully entitled to humane treatment under Common
54
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Instead, these persons were
55
deemed to be “unlawful enemy combatants,” and any hostile acts
they committed, even attempts to defend themselves, were
56
characterized as war crimes. Furthermore, because the United States
was involved in a “Global War on Terrorism,” anyone involved in a
terrorist attack was considered a war criminal, rather than a common
57
criminal as they had traditionally been viewed. But even under these
expansive interpretations of war crimes and war criminals, there were
still very few detainees against whom a credible case could be made in
court because few had been captured during combat. The lack of solid
evidence against detainees led the government to consider doing
something that no Western country had done since the end of World
58
War II: prosecuting juveniles as war criminals.

53. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al.,
Regarding Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 1 (Feb. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf (“By its terms, Geneva
applies to conflicts involving ‘High Contracting Parties,’ which can only be states. Moreover, it
assumes the existence of ‘regular’ armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war
against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach
commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states. . . . I
accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none of the
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere
throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party
to Geneva.”).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Robert K. Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law 4, 23–32 (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf.
56. Under 32 C.F.R. § 11.6, attempts or successful efforts to kill U.S. or Coalition forces, or
to destroy military property were subject to prosecution as war crimes. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2005).
57. JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33688, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
ACT OF 2006: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD
RULES AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 7 (2007).
58. See Defense Reply to D-012 to Government Response to Defense Motion for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to R.M.C. 907(b)(1)(A) (Child Soldier), United States v. Jawad,
(Military Comm’n, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba July 2, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/Jawad - D - 012 Motion to Dismiss Child Soldier.pdf (beginning on p. 82); see also
Editorial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, at A24.
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Since the 1980s, the use of child soldiers has become an
increasingly alarming problem worldwide. In an effort to combat this
unfortunate phenomenon, the United Nations developed an
international treaty barring the recruitment and use of children under
59
the age of eighteen in armed conflicts. This treaty reflected the
international consensus that child soldiers, even those who commit
atrocities, generally should be treated as victims of war, rehabilitated,
60
and reintegrated into society. The treaty entered into force on
61
62
February 12, 2002; the Senate ratified it on December 23, 2002, less
than one week after Jawad was detained. According to the treaty,
States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons
within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to
the present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from
service. States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons
all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological
63
recovery and their social reintegration.

The United States provided no such services to Jawad. Although
the treaty does not specifically bar the prosecution of child soldiers
for war crimes, allowing child soldiers to be prosecuted is inconsistent
with the intent and spirit of the treaty—particularly in a legal system
that was designed for adults and thus lacks provisions to address the
64
specific needs and issues of children. By definition, child soldiers

59. Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child
Pornography, GA Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001).
60. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement
of Children in Armed Conflict pmbl., May 25, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-37, 2173 U.N.T.S.
222, 236 (“The States Parties to the Present Protocol . . . [are c]onvinced of the need to
strengthen international cooperation in the implementation of this Protocol, as well as the
physical and psychosocial rehabilitation and social reintegration of children who are victims of
armed conflict . . . .”).
61. Id. art. 10, ¶ 1, 2173 U.N.T.S. at 222, 240.
62. Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Nov. 16,
2010, 7:55 AM), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV11-b&chapter=4&lang=en.
63. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 60, art. 6, ¶ 3, 2173 U.N.T.S. at 238–39.
64. See Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for
Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 358–59 (2007) (discussing the wider
ratification of the optional protocol in general recognition of the trauma that child soldiers
suffer).
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65

have been illegally recruited and are barred from combat because
they are too young to understand or comply with the law of armed
conflict, yet Jawad was being charged with an intentional violation of
the laws of war.
I challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction over Jawad on the
66
basis of his age at the time of capture, noting that the MCA did not
specifically authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over child soldiers
and the absence of any evidence that Congress had considered the
67
issue. I highlighted the lack of any provision—implicitly required by
the treaty—in the MCA or its implementing regulations addressing
68
the specific needs of juveniles.
The challenge was unsuccessful. The trial judge, Colonel Stephen
Henley, concluded that if Congress had intended to limit the
jurisdiction of the MCA to unlawful combatants of a certain age,
69
Congress would have so specified. Judge Henley was ultimately

65. In fact, under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is now a
war crime to recruit and utilize child soldiers. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xxvi), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 90 (defining the conscription or enlistment of
“children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using them to
participate actively in hostilities” as a war crime). The defendant at the very first trial at the
ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, was charged with this offense. Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR
THE INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Jan. 23,
2011).
66. Defense Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to R.M.C.
907(b)(1)(A) (Child Soldier), United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba June 13, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jawad - D - 012 Motion to
Dismiss Child Soldier.pdf.
67. There was not a single mention of the words “child soldier,” “juvenile,” or “minor” in
the legislative history of the 2006 MCA. Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 90, 102 (2009) (statement of Major David J.R. Frakt,
U.S. Air Force Reserve, Lead Defense Counsel, Office of Military Commissions—Defense).
68. Grossman, supra note 64, at 258–59; see also Paola Konge, International Crimes &
Child Soldiers, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 41, 57 (2010) (“The Optional Protocol is an example of a treaty
with widespread acceptance; 144 states had signed on as of June 16, 2006.”); Daniel Ryan, Case
Comment, International Law and Laws of War and International Criminal Law, 33 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 185 (2010) (“Congress should take immediate steps to amend the
MCA to exclude jurisdiction of the Commissions—or any other judicial forum—over child
soldiers. Such policy initiatives would serve to hold child soldiers accountable through ageappropriate rehabilitation programs, fulfill the United States’ obligations under the Optional
Protocol, and restore the United States to a position of leadership in developing, promoting and
protecting the rights of children in armed conflict.” (footnote omitted)).
69. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 338, 339 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Sept. 24, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Personal Jurisdiction: Child
Soldier (D-012)) (“The MCA does not contain any age limitation, even though Congress was
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proven correct. In the summer of 2009, Congress considered reforms
to the MCA. On July 30, 2009, I testified before a House
Subcommittee and recommended that the new MCA include an age
70
limitation, but Congress adopted no age limit in the Military
71
Commissions Act of 2009. Congressman Jerrold Nadler later made it
72
clear that Congress had considered and rejected an age limitation.
This failure to amend the MCA cleared the way for the continued
prosecution of child soldier Omar Khadr, who was fifteen years old at
73
the time U.S. forces captured him in Afghanistan.
Although my argument that Jawad’s age deprived the court of
personal jurisdiction failed, my argument that his status as an
unlawful enemy combatant was insufficient to confer subject matter
74
jurisdiction was more successful.
As mentioned previously, Jawad was charged with attempted
75
“Murder in Violation of the Law of War.” Although many of the
crimes listed in the MCA were derived directly from the Geneva
aware of how to state exceptions to application of the MCA. Nor is there any evidence that
Congress intended an age limitation.” (citation omitted)).
70. Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions System, supra note 67, at 90, 102–03
(statement of Major Frakt).
71. Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (Supp. III 2009). In fact, the
Obama administration is continuing to prosecute one detainee, Omar Khadr, who was a
juvenile at the time of his capture. Carol Rosenberg, New Khadr Trial Date, MIAMI HERALD,
May 11, 2010, available at Rec. No. 201005111747KNRIDDERFLMIAMIH_be484e0fc02f7396
144c62e8f50a67d4.
72. “[A]dditional changes suggested by the Judiciary Committee—including a sunset
provision, a voluntariness requirement for all statements, a different appeals structure, and a
prohibition on the trial of child soldiers by military commission—should have been adopted.” 155
CONG. REC. H11,133 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2009) (statement of Rep. Ralph Nadler) (emphasis
added).
73. See Christopher L. Dore, What to Do with Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on
Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1281, 1288 (2008) (“Meanwhile, more juvenile prisoners were arriving at Guantanamo,
some as young as ten. After spending twenty-eight months in solitary confinement, the United
States charged Omar [Khadr] with Murder in Violation of the Law of War and four lesser
charges.” (footnote omitted)).
74. See Defense Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction under R.M.C. 907 (D-007) at 7, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 28, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20080528Defense Motion To Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense - Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction D-007.pdf (“In sum, Mr. Jawad did not commit an attack against a protected person
or through a prohibited means. Even assuming he qualifies for personal jurisdiction as an
unlawful enemy combatant, this status does not convert his alleged grenade toss into a war
crime. This Commission therefore has no subject matter jurisdiction to try Mr. Jawad for
attempted murder and causing serious bodily injury.”).
75. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Conventions or other attempts to codify the law of war, such as in the
76
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the U.S. War
77
Crimes Act, murder in violation of the law of war was not one of
78
them.
76. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 65, art. 8, 2187 U.N.T.S.
at 94–98; see also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1172 (May 3, 1993) (granting
jurisdiction to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over
“[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war”).
77. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
78. Scholars have discussed whether the crimes of attempt, terrorism, material support for
terrorism, and conspiracy were war crimes recognized in international law prior to the
enactment of the MCA. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Promotion and
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including
the Right to Development: Addendum, Human Rights Council 12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3
(Nov. 22, 2007) (by Martin Scheinin) (“[T]he offences listed in Section 950v(24)-(28) of the
[MCA] (terrorism, providing material support for terrorism, wrongfully aiding the enemy,
spying, and conspiracy) go beyond offences under the laws of war.”); ELSEA, supra note 57, at
11 (“Although many of the crimes defined in the MCA seem to be well-established offenses
against the law of war, at least in the context of an international armed conflict, a court might
conclude that some of the listed crimes are new.”); PETER VICKERY, TIM MCCORMACK,
ALASTAIR NICHOLSON, HILARY CHARLESWORTH, GAVAN GRIFFITH, ANDREW BYRNES,
GIDEON BOAS, STUART KAYE & DON ROTHWELL, ADVICE: IN THE MATTER OF THE
LEGALITY OF THE CHARGE AGAINST DAVID HICKS 4 (2007), available at http://www.icjaust.org.au/images/stories/documents/070308_-_LCA_-_Hicks_Advice.pdf (“[T]here is no
agreed definition of the international crime of terrorism in the Law of War as it currently stands
and so there can be no crime of ‘providing material support for terrorism’ in the Law of War
either.”); George P. Fletcher, Editorial Comment, Guantánamo Revisited: The Hamdan Case
and Conspiracy as a War Crime: A New Beginning for International Law in the United States, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 442, 446 (2006) (noting that “international arguments in the post-World War
II period have quietly dropped all . . . charges to conspiracy”); George P. Fletcher, Hamdan
Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 427, 446 (2007)
(“[N]either conspiracy nor membership in a terrorist organization meets the standards of an
international crime acceptable to the leading legal systems of the world.”); David Glazier, A
Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo Military
Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 177 (2008) (“[W]hile providing material support
to terrorism is clearly an offense against U.S. federal law, its trial as a war crime seems
unprecedented.”); see also David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5, 74–75 (2005) (“[R]egardless of the type of [military] tribunal
[that has been used], the substantive law being applied is international law . . . which cannot be
created by the enactment of any particular national legislature. This was highlighted in the
general rejection of the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy as a war crime.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Michael O. Lacey, Military Commissions: A Historical Survey,
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 41, 41 (“[M]ilitary commissions, or tribunals, have received
widespread media and public attention . . . . Much of the unfavorable publicity stems from a
serious misunderstanding of the history, nature, and purpose of these commissions.”). Claims of
ex post facto punishment were raised frequently in pretrial litigation in the earlier military
commissions under the president’s order, including in the cases against David Hicks and Salim
Hamdan. Thus far, all pretrial attempts to challenge individual offenses on retroactivity grounds
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Although there is some historical basis for trying the crime of
79
murder in violation of the law of war in military commissions, the
interpretation of the offense by the Department of Defense (DOD)
was unprecedented. The status-based theory of unlawful combatancy
80
was actually introduced in the penal-code-implementing regulation
for the military commissions established by executive order on
81
November 13, 2001. This regulation included the offense of “Murder
by an Unprivileged Belligerent,” which applied to all murders in the
context of armed conflict by one who did not “enjoy combatant
82
immunity.” A comment in this regulation made it clear that the

have failed. See, e.g., United States v. Khadr, 1 M.C. 199, 202 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba Apr. 21, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss Charge One for Failure to State
an Offense and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (D-008)) (concluding that “prosecution
of Mr. Khadr for the offense of murder in violation of the law of war . . . does not violate ex post
facto standards—whether under the Constitution or international law”). Also, whether
conspiracy and material support were traditional war crimes properly subject to trial by military
commission was the basis of a pretrial motion to dismiss in the case of United States v. Hamdan.
The motion was denied. United States v. Hamdan, 2 M.C. 1, 6 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba July 24, 2008) (ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) (D-012) and Defense
Request to Address Supplemental Authority on D-012 (D-050)) (“The Government has shown,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Congress had an adequate basis upon which to
conclude that conspiracy and material support for terrorism have traditionally been considered
violations of the law of war.”). Hamdan was acquitted of conspiracy but was convicted of
material support. The question of whether material support is an offense properly within the
jurisdiction of a military commission and the correctness of Judge Allred’s ruling is currently
being considered on appeal to the CMCR. A similar ex post facto claim is currently being
considered on appeal in United States v. al Bahlul. See Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 26,
United States v. al Bahlul, No. 09-001 (Ct. Military Comm’n Rev. Guantánamo Bay Cuba Sept
1, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/6%20%20%20United States v%20%20al
Bahlul - Brief for Appellant (1 September 2009).pdf.
79. During the Civil War, several persons were convicted of “murder in violation of the
laws of war” by military commissions. CHARLES ROSCOE HOWLAND, A DIGEST OF OPINIONS
OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY 1071–72 (1912). According to Howland,
the charges related to “the alleged killing, by shooting or unwarrantably harsh treatment, of
officers or soldiers, after they had surrendered, or while they were held in confinement as
prisoners of war.” Id. at 1071. Thus, this offense was comparable to the modern day offenses of
“Murder of Protected Persons,” 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(1) (2006), and “Cruel or Inhuman
Treatment,” id. § 950v(b)(12). The only other example Howland gives of murder in violation of
the laws of war was the 1873 trial by military commission of the Modoc Indians for “a
treacherous killing of an enemy during a truce.” HOWLAND, supra, at 1072 n.1. Treachery,
perfidy, and misusing a truce are also prohibited under the law of war and separately punishable
under the MCA. See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(1)(17)–(18).
80. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2005).
81. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
82. 32 C.F.R. § 11.6(b)(3).
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crime was based on the status of the attacker, not the nature of the
83
attack.
After this initial attempt at establishing military commissions was
invalidated, Congress largely adopted the list of criminal offenses
from the instruction into the MCA, but replaced the crime of murder
by an unprivileged belligerent with murder in violation of the law of
84
war. The definition of murder in violation of the law of war
contained no reference to unprivileged belligerency or combatant
immunity, nor did the elements of the offense as listed in the Manual
85
for Military Commissions (Manual). But the Manual crossreferenced the murder in violation of the law of war definition with a
86
comment to another offense, which included this key sentence: “For
the accused to have been acting in violation of the law of war, the
accused must have taken acts as a combatant without having met the
87
requirements for lawful combatancy.” In other words, whatever act
makes one an unlawful combatant is a per se violation of the law of
war. Thus the administration interpreted murder in violation of the
88
law of war to be identical to murder by an unprivileged belligerent.
The government’s interpretation that any act of violence towards
a military target by an unlawful combatant was a violation of the law
of war sharply conflicted with the views of leading law-of-war
scholars. Professor Yoram Dinstein has written extensively on the
89
distinction between unlawful combatants and war criminals, noting
83. “Even an attack on a soldier would be a crime if the attacker did not enjoy ‘belligerent
privilege’ or ‘combatant immunity.’” Id. § 11.6(b)(3)(ii)(B).
84. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons,
including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such
other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 950v(b)(15).
85. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) one or more persons are dead; (2) the
death or deaths resulted from the act or omission of the accused; (3) the killing was unlawful;
(4) the accused intended to kill the person or persons; (5) the killing was in violation of the law
of war; and (6) the killing took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict.
U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. IV, § 6(15)(b), at IV-12 (2007).
86. Id. § 6(15)(c), at IV-12.
87. Id. § 6(13)(d), at IV-11.
88. The Manual was promulgated by the secretary of defense in consultation with the
attorney general. The Office of Military Commissions—Prosecution was staffed by both military
prosecutors and DOJ prosecutors, but the DOJ lawyers were responsible for the overarching
legal strategy. This interpretation of murder in violation of the law of war was the official
position of those responsible for prosecuting detainees and has been consistently argued, albeit
with little success, in every prosecution in which the crime was charged.
89. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004) [hereinafter DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
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“eight respects in which the concepts of war crimes and unlawful
90
combatancy diverge sharply,” including the key one: “A war
criminal is tried by virtue of international law . . ., whereas an
91
unlawful combatant is prosecuted under domestic law[,]” unless the
92
unlawful combatant commits a specific international crime. The
germ of the government’s theory to the contrary is found in the
93
World War II–era case Ex Parte Quirin, particularly in the final,
misleading sentence of these dicta:
[T]he law of war draws a distinction between . . . those who are
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military
forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by
94
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.

According to Professor Dinstein, the Court’s explanation was
flawed:
It is true that sometimes the act which turns a person into an
unlawful combatant constitutes by itself an offense (under either
domestic or international law) and can be prosecuted and punished
as such before a military tribunal. But the fulcrum of unlawful
combatancy is that the judicial proceedings may be conducted
before regular domestic (civil or military) courts and, significantly,
they may relate to acts other than those that divested the person of
95
the status of lawful combatant.

Professor George Fletcher concurs, calling “the giant leap from the
status of failing to qualify as a lawful combatant to the crime of being
an unlawful combatant” in Quirin, “one of the greatest legal fallacies
96
[he has] ever encountered.”
HOSTILITIES]; Yoram Dinstein, The Distinction Between Unlawful Combatants and War
Criminals, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
SHABTAI ROSENNE 103 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); Yoram Dinstein, Unlawful Combatancy, in
79 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 151
(Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson eds., 2003).
90. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra, note 89, at 233.
91. Id. at 234.
92. Id. at 237.
93. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
94. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
95. DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES, supra note 89, at 30.
96. George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 517, 541 (2007); see also R.R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies,

FRAKT IN FINAL.DOC

2011]

3/2/2011 1:19:50 PM

MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF GUANTÁNAMO

1385

2. Litigation over Murder in Violation of the Law of War in the
Military Commissions. Jawad’s case squarely presented the question
of whether the government’s interpretation of this offense was
legitimate. If in fact Jawad had engaged in a hostile act against U.S.
forces—throwing a hand grenade—as the prosecution believed at the
time the charges were referred, that act would have made him an
unlawful enemy combatant. But based on his asserted status as an
unlawful enemy combatant, the government also deemed him to be
“in violation of the law of war”—a war criminal. There was scant
97
legal support for this interpretation of the law of war. Between May
and November 2008, in a series of briefs in support of a motion to
dismiss, I set out the defense’s view that unlawful combatant status
alone was not enough to prove a violation of the law of war, a
98
required element of the charged offense. The government insisted
that Jawad’s status was a per se law-of-war violation, and they argued
99
this position in response to the motion to dismiss. In fact, even after
100
the judge issued a ruling endorsing the defense’s analysis and
admonished the government not to go forward with the charges, the
101
prosecution persisted, filing a motion to reconsider, which the judge

Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L., 323, 327 (1951) (“The determination of the
requirements to be established for those claiming prisoner-of-war status has not been easy, and
it has been equally troublesome to assess the basis on which persons not so qualifying should be
penalized or punished—whether as war criminals, or as violators of the laws and customs of war,
or merely as persons whose acts have been harmful to the opposing belligerent.”).
97. See supra notes 49–58, 75–88 and accompanying text.
98. Defense Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense and for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Under R.M.C. 907, supra note 74.
99. Government’s Response to the Defense’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an
Offense and for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under R.M.C. 907 (D-007), United States
v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba June 3, 2008), available at http://
www.defense.gov/news/d20080528Defense Motion To Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction D-007.pdf (beginning on p. 31).
100. United States v. Jawad, slip op. at 3 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Sept.
24, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (D-007)),
available at http://www.defense.gov/news/RULING D-007 (subject matter jurisdiction) (2).pdf
(“The government has not cited any persuasive authority for the proposition that acting as an
unlawful enemy combatant, by itself, is a violation of the laws of war in the context of noninternational armed conflict.”).
101. Government Motion for Reconsideration (D-007), United States v. Jawad (Military
Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20081104JawadD007Reconsider.pdf (beginning on p. 2); see also Email from David Frakt,
Defense Counsel, Office of Military Comm’ns, to James Polley, Office of Gen. Counsel, Dep’t
of Defense (Oct. 21 2008, 5:15PM), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20081104Jawad
D007Reconsider.pdf (beginning on p. 12) (arguing that the government’s reply was untimely).
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102

denied. While this legal battle was being fought, it became clear that
the ability to charge detainees under this theory was central to the
prosecution’s strategy in the military commissions.
While the motion in the Jawad case was pending, the same issue
arose in the trial of Salim Hamdan in a dispute over jury instructions.
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in violation
103
of the law of war. The prosecution argued that any killing of a
lawful combatant by an unlawful combatant would violate the law of
war, stating that “[t]he U.S. government’s position has always been
104
that . . . unlawful belligerency is a per se violation of the law of war.”
The judge, Navy Captain Keith Allred, rejected this argument. He
ruled that “[t]here is no offense under the law of war of murdering a
lawful combatant . . . [u]nless it’s done in an unlawful way, such as a
105
way that inflicts undue suffering or uses a prohibited weapon.”
On August 13, 2008, less than ten days after the Hamdan trial
concluded, a hearing on my motion to dismiss was held. Professor
Madeline Morris of Duke University School of Law testified as an
expert for the defense that throwing a hand grenade at lawful
combatants, even if done by an unlawful combatant, was not a
violation of the law of war. The government offered no expert
testimony or other evidence. Judge Henley indicated that he was
skeptical of the government’s position that “status alone” was enough
106
to prove a law-of-war violation. He admonished the government: “If

102. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 347, 348 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 29, 2008) (ruling on Government Motion for Reconsideration (D-007)). The government’s
refusal to accept judicial rulings and its filing of meritless motions to reconsider was also typical
both in Jawad’s military commission and in the military commissions generally. See, e.g., United
States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 49 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Mar. 14, 2008) (ruling
on reconsideration on Motion for Stay and for Access to High Value Detainees (P-004));
United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 149 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 29, 2008)
(ruling on Motion For Reconsideration and Resentencing (P-009)). In Jawad, the government
also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Motion to Dismiss. This motion is on file
with the author and has never been publicly released. The court’s ruling on the motion is
publicly available, however. See Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—
Unlawful Influence (D-004), United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 322 (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Aug. 14, 2008).
103. Charge Sheet of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, supra note 51.
104. Transcript of Record at 3765, United States v. Hamdan (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/20-21Hamdan-1 Aug and 4 Aug 08-FINAL-3648-3890 Redacted.pdf.
105. Id. at 3823.
106. Transcript of Record at 583–84, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba Aug. 13, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[I]t should be clear now that,
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you intend to rely in whole or in part on that, then that issue should
and will be addressed before we begin the trial, if we ever get that
107
far.” He then ordered additional briefing by both parties. The
government did not alter its position, continuing to conflate these two
very distinct categories of people—unlawful combatants and war
criminals.
108
Judge Henley issued his ruling on September 24, 2008, holding
that “the propriety of the charges in this case must be based on the
nature of the act” and ordering the government to prove “that the
109
method, manner or circumstances used violated the law of war.”
Judge Henley pointedly rejected the government’s legal fallacy,
stating that the “government has not cited any persuasive authority
for the proposition that acting as an unlawful enemy combatant, by
110
itself, is a violation of the laws of war.” Judge Henley also dismissed
the government’s argument that murder in violation of the law of war
was equivalent to the discarded crime of murder by an unprivileged
belligerent: “If Congress intended to make any murder committed by
an unlawful enemy combatant a law of war violation, they could have
111
said so. They did not.” Nevertheless, Judge Henley declined to
grant the motion to dismiss because the government claimed to have
112
additional evidence that Jawad had violated the law of war.
Although the government technically won the motion, the
prosecutors were so dissatisfied with the ruling that they filed a
113
motion to reconsider on October 9, 2008. In a subsequent filing, the
government admitted it had no other proof of a law-of-war violation:
“Under the military judge’s current construction of the M.C.A., the
evidence the government intends to offer at trial will not establish the
the court, the commission is not joined in [the] position [that status alone is enough].” (quoting
Colonel Henley, Military J.))
107. Id. at 583.
108. United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Sept. 24, 2008)
(ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (D-007)), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/RULING D-007 (subject matter jurisdiction) (2).pdf.
109. Id., slip op. at 2–3.
110. Id., slip op. at 3.
111. Id., slip op. at 3.
112. Transcript of Record, supra note 106, at 583 (“We’ll play out a lot more facts and
circumstances to show that it goes beyond just a mere status as the basis of the charge.” (quoting
Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson, Assistant Trial Counsel)); id. at 706 (“At one of the previous
sessions, Colonel Stevenson, my recollection is, when asked by myself, you offered a position
that the government would be able to prove a law of war violation without reference to status.”
(quoting Colonel Henley, Military J.)).
113. Government Motion for Reconsideration (D-007), supra note 101.
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requirement of the ‘in violation of the law of war’ element.”
Nevertheless, the prosecution urged that this issue was of such
“central importance to this case, specifically, and to the military
commission process, in general” that if the military judge was
unwilling to adopt the government’s interpretation, he should dismiss
115
the charge to allow an interlocutory appeal to the CMCR.
Judge Henley denied the motion for reconsideration on October
116
29, 2008. Although the prosecutors had conceded that they could
not prove the charges, they refused my requests to voluntarily dismiss
117
them. Just a few days later, Judge Henley’s ruling was endorsed by
another judge in the course of crafting jury instructions in United
States v. al Bahlul, the last military commission under the 2006 MCA
118
and 2007 Manual. That judge, Air Force Colonel Ronald Gregory,
rejected the government’s proposed instructions, which relied on
119
unlawful-combatant status to prove a law-of-war violation, and gave

114. Government Reply to Defense Response to Motion for Reconsideration (D-007) at 12,
United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20081104JawadD007Reconsider.pdf (beginning on p. 15).
115. Id.
116. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 347, 347 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 29, 2008) (ruling on Government Motion for Reconsideration (D-007)) (“The
Government’s additional legal precedent and argument submitted in support of its request for
reconsideration is unpersuasive . . . .”).
117. This ethically dubious behavior by Office of Military Commissions prosecutors was,
unfortunately, not uncommon. The ethically challenged atmosphere led numerous prosecutors
to resign from the Office of Military Commissions, including the lead prosecutor in the Jawad
case. See, e.g., Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld at 1, United States v.
Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Sept. 22, 2008), available at
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/
testimonies-of-prosecution-lawyers/vandeveld_declaration.pdf (“I recently asked to be
permitted to resign from the OMC-P . . . .”); Dan Ephron & Daniel Stone, Gitmo Grievances,
NEWSWEEK, May 26, 2008, at 24, 25 (“[Colonel Morris] Davis is just one of several military
prosecutors who have come to believe the Guantánamo tribunal process is deeply flawed. None
of these men is a bleeding-heart type; they are spit-and-polish career officers. But in the past
four years, at least five of them have quit their jobs or walked away from Gitmo cases because
they believed their own integrity was being compromised.”); see also Gregory S. McNeal,
Organizational Culture, Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 125,
133 (2009) (“Colonel [Morris] Davis, the Chief Prosecutor of the military commissions, resigned
after criticizing the process for its politically-motivated undue command influence.”).
118. Al Bahlul was the second detainee to be tried by military commission. His trial
commenced October 27, 2008. I was his appointed defense counsel.
119. The government provided draft jury instructions to the judge that would have
instructed the members consistent with the government theory that any killing by an unlawful
combatant was a per se violation of the law of war. The judge modified the government’s
proposed instructions to conform to Judge Henley’s rulings in the Jawad case. The
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120

instructions that echoed Judge Henley’s ruling. Al Bahlul declined
to put on any defense and was convicted of all charges.
Sadly, the battle over the interpretation of murder in violation of
121
the law of war appears far from over. Because the trial judges have
refused to instruct juries in accordance with the government’s theory
and because Judge Henley refused to dismiss the charges as the
government requested, no appellate court has had occasion to
interpret this offense. Until there is an appellate ruling, military
commission trial judges have no official guidance other than the
discussion in the Manual for Military Commissions. Although the
previous misleading comment in the Manual has been removed, it has
been replaced in the 2010 version by a comment demonstrating that
the current administration still intends to prosecute individuals under
the same flawed theory:
[A]n accused may be convicted in a military commission . . . if the
commission finds that the accused . . . engaged in conduct
traditionally triable by military commission (e.g., . . . murder
committed while the accused did not meet the requirements of
privileged belligerency) even if such conduct does not violate the
122
international law of war.

government’s proposed instructions do not appear in the trial record of United States v. al
Bahlul.
120. As Colonel Gregory noted,
A violation of the law of war may be proven by either the killing of protected
persons or by using a means, weapon, or technique considered illegal under the laws
of war. . . .
A killing may also violate the law of war where an accused, regardless of status as
a lawful or unlawful combatant, intentionally and without justification kills any
person by a method, manner, or under circumstances that violate the law of war.
Transcript of Trial at 853, United States v. al Bahlul (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 31, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/05 al Bahlul-trans-Pages 717-993Redacted.pdf.
121. In the summer of 2009, as Congress was considering proposals to reform the military
commissions, I was invited to testify. One of my recommendations was to codify Judge Henley’s
ruling by adding the following definition into the MCA:
IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF WAR—The term ‘in violation of the law of
war’ means in a method or manner or under circumstances which violate the law of
war. The mere status of being an unprivileged enemy belligerent, without more, is
insufficient to establish that an act was ‘in violation of the law of war[.]’
Proposals for Reform of the Military Commissions System, supra note 67, at 105 (statement of
Major David J.R. Frakt, U.S. Air Force Reserve, Lead Defense Counsel, Office of Military
Commissions—Defense). Congress did not follow my recommendation.
122. U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. IV, § 5(15)(c), at IV-13 (2010) (emphasis
added).
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Despite the current administration’s professed determination to limit
123
military commissions to law-of-war offenses, this comment flatly
states that an actual violation of the law of war is not required for trial
on this offense—a statement that contradicts both the title and the
listed elements of the offense. Given that the guidance in the Manual
is directly contrary to the conclusions reached by Judges Henley,
Allred, and Gregory, there is sure to be further litigation on the
124
issue.
B. Use of Coerced Statements
One of the principal bases for criticism of the military
125
commissions was the potential admissibility of coerced statements.
The government’s reliance on coerced statements took center stage in
the Jawad case. Jawad allegedly made several self-incriminating
statements during his first twenty-four hours in custody, both while in
the hands of the Afghan police and, later, when turned over to U.S.
forces. The defense’s view was that these confessions were the
product of torture or, at least, of coercion. None of the statements he
made would have been admissible in a civilian court or a courtmartial, which would have required the statements to meet a
126
voluntariness standard. But under the MCA, the admissibility of a

123. See Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-OnNational-Security-5-21-09 (“[D]etainees who violate the laws of war . . . are . . . best tried
through military commissions. . . . [Military commissions] are an appropriate venue for trying
detainees for violations of the laws of war.”).
124. See David Frakt, New Manual For Military Commissions Disregards the Commanderin-Chief, Congressional Intent and the Laws of War, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2010,
6:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-c_b_557720.html
(“The absurdity of claiming that no actual violation of the law of war is required to commit
murder in violation of the law of war severely undermines the Administration’s claims of
commitment to adherence to the rule of law and their pledge to use military commissions only
to prosecute law of war offenses.”).
125. See, e.g., Letter from William H. Neukom, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to President
George W. Bush (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/antiterror/
2008feb27_detainees_l.pdf (“Under the current system, we believe that detainees will not
receive due process or fair trials. . . . [S]tatements secured through coercion could be introduced
against a defendant.”); Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees
for Violations of the Law of War: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th Cong. 8
(2009) (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel, Department of Defense) (“The most
prominent criticism we hear of the current Military Commissions Act is that it permits the use of
[coerced] statements, if obtained before December 30, 2005.”).
126. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (noting that both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require “that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into
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statement hinged on whether the statement was the product of
torture or merely the product of coercion. Confessions resulting from
127
torture were barred, but coerced statements were potentially
admissible. When the “degree of coercion” was disputed, the military
judge was instructed to apply a “totality of the circumstances”
approach to determine whether the statement was “reliable and
sufficient[ly] probative” and whether “the interests of justice” would
128
be served by admitting the statement.
We filed two motions to suppress, one addressing the alleged
confession made to the Afghan police and a second directed at
statements made to U.S. authorities. The government’s response was
to deny that the statements were the product of either coercion or
torture. At the very least, the prosecution argued, given that the
government disputed the degree of coercion, the proper standard to
apply was not the standard of Military Commission Rule of Evidence
(MCRE) 304(a)(3), which mandated exclusion for statements
obtained by torture, but the more permissive standard of MCRE
304(c), which permits the judge to perform a balancing test and admit
evidence based on the “interests of justice” when the “degree of
coercion” involved in obtaining the statement does not rise to the
129
level of torture.
evidence”), and United States v. Bubonics, 45 M.J. 93, 95 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“The necessary
inquiry is whether the confession is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice
by its maker. If, instead, the maker’s will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination
was critically impaired, use of his confession would offend due process.”), with U.S. MANUAL
FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. III, M.C.R.E. 304(c)(1)–(2), at III-9 (2007) (utilizing a standard
that allows coerced statements to be admitted if the “the totality of the circumstances renders
the statement reliable” and, if the statement was obtained post-December 30, 2005, that it was
not obtained by “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”).
127. See U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. III, M.C.R.E. 304(a)(1) (“A statement
obtained by use of torture shall not be admitted into evidence against any party or witness,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”). Article
15 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, which the United States has ratified, prohibits the use of statements
obtained by torture in any judicial proceeding. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 15, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113 (“Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any
proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made.”).
128. U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. III, M.C.R.E. 304(c)(1), at III-9.
129. See Court Ordered Brief Regarding D-021 and D-022 at 1, United States v. Jawad
(Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/Dec2008/4Dec08EXHIBITSA-H-redacted.pdf (beginning on p. 52) (articulating the
defense’s argument that “MCRE 304(a)(1) requires suppression of all alleged statements of Mr.
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At the hearing on the motions in September 2008, the defense
offered a declaration from Jawad that he had initially denied being
involved in the hand grenade attack but that the Afghan police had
threatened to kill him or a member of his family unless he confessed.
The military judge ordered additional briefing as to whether this
constituted torture under the MCRE. According to the government’s
brief, even if Jawad’s version of the events were credited, the
resulting confession still should be considered the product not of
torture, but, at worst, of coercion. Prosecutors offered two arguments
why these death threats did not constitute torture. First, they argued
that only “imminent” death threats qualify as torture, and these were
130
not imminent. Second, they asserted that, for his statement to be the
product of torture, Jawad would have had to actually suffer
“prolonged mental harm” and that the burden was on the defense to
131
prove such suffering. In response, the defense argued that “[i]t is
not necessary for the defense to allege or prove harm in order to
132
demonstrate that torture has occurred under M.C.R.E. 304.”
Rather, the intent of the government official to cause harm is the
determining factor. As for the imminence of the threat, we noted that
Jawad made in Afghan police custody on 17 December 2002 as such statements were the result
of torture”); Defense Response to Government Brief on the Issue of Torture Under M.C.R.E.
304 (D-021, D-022) at 14, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2008/4Dec08EXHIBITSA-Hredacted.pdf (beginning on p. 27) (“The government has failed to meet their burden of proving
that Mr. Jawad’s alleged confessions were the product of anything other than torture and
coercion. The statements must be suppressed.”); Government Brief on the Issue of Torture
Under M.C.R.E. 304 (D-021, D-022) at 3, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2008/
4Dec08EXHIBITSA-H-redacted.pdf (beginning on p. 42) (“The accused’s recent, unsworn
allegations of threats in this case . . . are insufficient to establish ‘torture’ as defined under the
MCA and MMC, such that his statements to the Afghan police should be suppressed.”);
Government Response to the Defense Brief on the Issue of Torture Under M.C.R.E. 304
(D-021, D-022) at 1, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Oct. 10,
2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Dec2008/4Dec08EXHIBITSA-H-redacted.pdf
(beginning on p. 18) (“The arguments in the defense brief . . . do not support finding that the
accused was ‘tortured’ as defined under M.C.R.E. 304.”).
130. Government Brief on the Issue of Torture Under M.C.R.E. 304, supra note 129, at 4–5
(“Regarding any threats allegedly made against himself, even if believed . . . the accused’s bare,
unsworn allegation that the Afghan police threatened to ‘kill me’ does not establish a threat of
imminent death against him. . . . [T]he alleged threat against his family is so indefinite and so
removed from any ability to immediately act on it that it could not possibly amount to a threat
of imminent death under M.C.R.E. 304(b)(3).”).
131. Id. at 5 (“[T]hreats alone are not enough to establish torture under M.C.R.E. 304(b)(3),
absent a showing of ‘prolonged mental harm’ caused by or resulting therefrom.”).
132. Defense Response to Government Brief on the Issue of Torture Under M.C.R.E. 304,
supra note 129, at 3–4.
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“[t]he police clearly had the present ability to carry out the threat to
kill him, and Mr. Jawad quite reasonably presumed that the
numerous high-ranking police and security officials involved in his
interrogation would be capable of locating and arresting his family
133
members.”
In his ruling suppressing the statements, Judge Henley explicitly
rejected the government’s attempts to increase the burden on the
defense to prove that a statement was the product of torture, stating
that “the actual infliction of physical or mental injury is not
134
required.” Rather, “[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the threat was
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering upon another person within the interrogator’s custody or
135
control.”
He rejected the government’s position that the
appropriate rule to apply was the coercion rule, under which the
statements might still be admissible.
Having determined that the initial confession to the Afghan
authorities was the product of torture, Judge Henley then turned to
the subsequent self-incriminating statements made by Jawad during
interrogations by U.S. personnel later the same night. The defense,
136
citing Clewis v. Texas, argued that these statements must also be
suppressed because the effects of the earlier torture had not
dissipated, and there was “no break in the stream of events” between
137
the two interrogations. The government disputed that the effect of
torture could carry over from one interrogation to the next, arguing
that “M.C.R.E. 304(b)(3)’s definition of ‘torture’ is based on acts of
specifically intended consequences done by a specific actor to a
person within that actor’s custody, which implies a narrow focus on
138
each individual interrogator or interrogation.”
Once again, the military judge rejected the government’s efforts
to narrowly construe the scope of the phrase “obtained by torture.”
In his ruling suppressing the statements made to the U.S.

133. Id. at 12.
134. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 345, 346 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Oct. 28, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements of the Accused
to Afghan Authorities (D-022)).
135. Id.
136. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1966).
137. Court Ordered Brief Regarding D-021 and D-022, supra note 129, at 4 (quoting Clewis,
386 U.S. at 710).
138. Government Response to the Defense Brief on the Issue of Torture Under M.C.R.E.
304, supra note 129, at 6.
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interrogators, Judge Henley held that the effects of torture can carry
over from one interrogation to the next, and he found that they had
done so in this case. Specifically, he ruled that when a confession is
“acquired due to actual coercion or duress,” any “subsequent
139
confession is presumptively tainted.” The judge stated that the
Government could overcome the presumption by demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that the coercion “had sufficiently
140
dissipated” when the subsequent confession was obtained.
Judge Henley’s ruling represented a major setback for the
government. Faced with the embarrassing prospect of having to
voluntarily dismiss the charges for lack of evidence, the government
filed an interlocutory appeal of Judge Henley’s ruling to the CMCR,
arguing that he had applied the wrong legal standard to the second
confession by applying the torture-exclusion portion of MCRE 304
141
instead of the coercion-balancing part of the rule. The central
argument of the government’s brief was that the prohibition of the
use of statements obtained by torture in military commissions only
applied to statements obtained during specific interrogation sessions
in which torture was used. Under the government’s view,
[T]he frame of reference for assessing whether a particular
statement is “obtained by use of torture” is whether the interrogator
to whom it was made used torture to get it. . . . [L]inking subsequent
confessions, temporally or otherwise, to a previous confession made
to different interrogators—simply does not fall within the meaning
142
of “obtained by use of torture” under M.C.R.E. 304(a)(1).

Under this logic, a government interrogator could torture a detainee
during interrogation sessions for months on end to elicit a confession.
Once the confession had been secured, if a new interrogator then
questioned the detainee the very next day in a coercive manner not

139. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 349, 350 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Nov. 19, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Suppress Out-of-Court Statements by the Accused
Made While in U.S. Custody (D-021)).
140. Id.
141. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 19, United States v. Jawad, No. 08-004 (Ct. Military
Comm’n Rev. Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
news/Dec2008/4Dec08ProsecutionBrief.pdf (“[T]he Military Judge should have examined the
totality of the circumstances in which the statements to U.S. authorities were made to determine
directly whether those statements were ‘obtained by use of torture’ under the M.C.A., or were
otherwise the product of coercion.”).
142. Id. at 21.
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rising to the level of torture, and the detainee confessed again, this
second confession could not be considered obtained by torture.
The defense was optimistic that the CMCR would uphold Judge
Henley’s suppression ruling, but the appeal was rendered moot when
the charges against Jawad were dismissed, and no ruling was issued.
Still, the significance of the suppression ruling should not be
overlooked. Jawad was the only detainee tried by a military
commission to have statements suppressed as the product of torture,
and his was the first case in which government lawyers were forced to
defend and explain the rules of evidence that permitted coerced
statements—an awkward position for the prosecution.
In reviewing whether to discontinue the use of military
commissions completely or to seek to improve them, the Obama
administration was forced to consider whether to endorse the prior
administration’s views and continue to seek the authority to use
coerced statements. The new administration chose to amend the rules
of evidence to bring them more closely into conformity with the rules
143
that apply in domestic courts. In the 2010 Manual for Military
Commissions, MCRE 304 has been substantially revised. The rule
now includes a derivative-evidence provision, which bars the
admissibility of evidence derived from statements obtained by torture
144
or cruel treatment and imposes a voluntariness standard as the
baseline for admissibility of statements, except in limited battlefield
145
interrogation situations.
The Obama administration’s change in attitude toward the use of
coerced statements also became apparent in Jawad’s habeas corpus
case. In its initial filing asserting the legal basis for holding Jawad as
an enemy combatant, the Department of Justice (DOJ) cited the very
statements that Judge Henley had suppressed as the product of
torture, as well as several other statements Jawad allegedly made in
146
interrogation sessions at Bagram and Guantánamo that military
143. Legal Issues Regarding Military Commissions and the Trial of Detainees for Violations
of the Law of War, supra note 125, at 8 (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, General Counsel,
Department of Defense) (highlighting “several changes to the Military Commissions Act
reflected in the proposed legislation[,] . . . which the administration supports”).
144. U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS pt. III, M.C.R.E. 304(a)(5), at III-8 to -9
(2010) (barring the use of such evidence, except when it “would have been obtained even if the
statement had not been made” or when “use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent
with the interests of justice”).
145. Id. pt. III, M.C.R.E. 304(a)(2)(B)(ii), at III-8.
146. The government filed this document under seal, as it contained classified data. As of
this date, an unredacted, releasable version of the document has not been made publicly
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commission prosecutors had chosen not to rely upon. We filed a
147
motion to suppress. Six months into the new administration, the
DOJ dramatically changed its position, withdrew its reliance on these
148
statements, and conceded the defense’s motion to suppress.
In his rulings on the motions to suppress, Judge Henley focused
on the abuse of Jawad by Afghan authorities. In response to another
motion, Judge Henley was forced to directly address the abuses that
Jawad had suffered in U.S. custody.
C. Torture
Reports that detainees were abused and tortured at Guantánamo
have been at the center of the controversy over the island prison
complex since its creation. The decision by President Bush that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply to Guantánamo detainees and the
approval of numerous harsh “enhanced interrogation techniques”
149
undoubtedly led to significant and widespread abuses of detainees.
But although many former detainees complained of abuses, these
complaints were often dismissed by the administration as
propaganda. Even though there were multiple high-level
150
investigations of detainee abuse at Guantánamo, and some abuses
available. The defense motion to suppress, however, references the filing and the various
statements relied upon by the government. See Petitioner Mohammed Jawad’s Motion to
Suppress His Out-of-Court Statements, supra note 42, at 1 (“The statements wrung from Mr.
Jawad in Afghanistan and at Guantánamo during more than fifty interrogations—even if
accurately reported in the Government’s unsworn hearsay summaries and interrogation
reports—do not remotely meet the standard for admissibility in a federal habeas proceeding.”).
147. Id.
148. Nedra Pickler, Justice Agrees to Exclude Detainee’s Confession, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 15, 2009, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D99F40BO9 (reporting that the DOJ would not
oppose the ACLU’s motion to exclude statements made by Jawad from consideration); see also
Bacha v. Obama, No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2149949 (D.D.C. July 17, 2009) (order granting Jawad’s
motion to suppress).
149. See S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF
DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY, at xiii (Comm. Print 2008) (“The President’s order closed off
application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which would have afforded
minimum standards for humane treatment, to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees.”). See generally
THE TORTURE REP., http://www.thetorturereport.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (investigating
rendition, detention, and interrogation under the Bush administration).
150. See, e.g., A.T. CHURCH, III, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., DETAINEE FILES: REVIEW
OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS AND DETAINEE INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES (U) (2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_
file625_26068.pdf (investigating the Department of Defense’s detention operations in the
Global War on Terror); JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, HAROLD BROWN, TILLIE K. FOWLER,
CHARLES A. HOMER & JAMES A. BLACKWELL, JR., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), available at http://www.
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were disclosed, these investigations failed to unearth the full extent of
the abuse. The Jawad case was perhaps the first in which the abuse of
a detainee could be proven with the government’s own documents.
Despite the fact that Jawad’s torture paled in comparison with the
151
abuse suffered by some other detainees, the existence of an official
paper trail (and the provision of that paper trail to the detainee’s
counsel) distinguished his situation from that of many other
detainees.
Among my first acts as defense counsel for Jawad was to send a
discovery request to my opposing counsel, Lieutenant Colonel Darrel
Vandeveld for all records relating to Jawad’s detention at
Guantánamo. Vandeveld dutifully gathered the records and sent
them to my office, highlighting one particular set of records for my
attention. These records contained irrefutable proof that Jawad had
been abused. The report included 112 entries describing relocation of
Jawad from one cell to another between May 7 and May 20, 2004—an
average of one relocation every two hours and fifty minutes for two
weeks. Importantly, in one instance, one of the guards recording the
information entered the term “frequent flyer” as the reason for the
move. “Frequent flyer” was the euphemism used by Guantánamo
152
detention personnel for an intentional sleep-deprivation program.
Sleep deprivation is a recognized form of psychological torture; the
author of one high-level Defense Department investigation into

humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/abuse/schlesinger_report.pdf (same); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION INTO FBI ALLEGATIONS OF
DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY (2005) [hereinafter
SCHMIDT REPORT] (investigating violations of Army interrogation procedures at the detention
facility in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba).
151. For example, the treatment received by Mohammed al-Qahtani was indisputably
worse. See generally Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063,
TIME, June 12, 2005, at 26 (reviewing the interrogation log of Mohammed al-Qahtani). Another
example was the treatment of the so-called high-value detainees, particularly in the secret CIA
ghost prisons. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF
FOURTEEN “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA CUSTODY 7–21 (2007), available at http://www.
nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf (describing the methods used on fourteen
individuals arrested in Pakistan and Thailand between 2002 and 2005); Mark Danner, US
Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 9, 2009, at 69, 69 (describing
stories of detainee abuse in the war on terrorism).
152. Richard Norton-Taylor, Court Attacks US Refusal to Disclose Torture Evidence:
Information Is Vital to UK Respondent’s Case: British Judges Say Claims Are Unprecedented,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 23, 2008, at 9; Josh White, Tactic Used After It Was Banned, WASH.
POST, Aug. 8, 2008, at A12 (noting that the sleep deprivation technique was “dubbed the
‘frequent flyer’ program in official documents”).
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detainee abuse determined that the frequent flyer program was a
153
form of detainee abuse.
Armed with this information, I filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Jawad on the basis of outrageous government
conduct, arguing that as a consequence of having tortured Jawad, the
154
government should forfeit the right to prosecute him. In two
155
hearings on June 19, 2008, and August 13–14, 2008, the defense
156
presented evidence and argued in support of the motion. At the
June 19 hearing, Jawad described the experience of undergoing the
157
sleep-deprivation program. At the August hearing, we introduced a
statement from Jawad describing his abusive treatment at Bagram
Prison that Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld had unearthed; this
statement was corroborated by a veteran agent of the Army Criminal
Investigation Command who had interviewed Jawad in the course of
investigating dozens of cases of detainee abuse—including two
158
homicides—at Bagram.
In his ruling, the military judge found that Jawad had been
abused:

153. Transcript of Hearing, Ex. 40 at 1–2, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba June 19, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
154. Defense Motion to Dismiss Based on Torture of Detainee Pursuant to RMC 907 (D008), supra note 10. The motion, attachments, government response, and initial defense reply
can be found at http://www.defense.gov/news/d20080528Defense Motion to Dismiss Based on
Torture of Detainee.pdf.
155. The oral argument that I gave at the June 19 hearing, in particular, received a
significant amount of attention. The ACLU published the entire argument on its website, and
several articles quoted excerpts. Jamil Dakwar, Guantánamo’s Frequent Flyer Program, ACLU
BLOG OF RIGHTS (June 20, 2008, 4:45 PM), http://blog.aclu.org/2008/06/20/guantnamosfrequent-flyer-program; Anthony Lewis, Official American Sadism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 25,
2008, at 45, 45, 48; Deborah Colson, Supreme Court Returns the Constitution to Guantánamo,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2008, 9:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborahcolson/the-supreme-court-returns_b_109260.html; Michael Winship, What Patriotism Is, and Is
Not, BILL MOYERS J. (July 2, 2008, 6:12 PM), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/blog/2008/07/
michael_winship_what_patriotis.html; see also Dan Froomkin, Battered Congress Syndrome,
WASH. POST (June 24, 2008, 11:31 AM), http://busharchive.froomkin.com/BL2008062400869_
pf.htm (excerpting a portion of the argument for his column).
156. See generally David J.R. Frakt, Closing Argument at Guantanamo: The Torture of
Mohammed Jawad, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2009) (publishing the defense’s closing argument
for a pretrial dismissal).
157. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 153, at 206–11; Fox, supra note 31 (reporting that
Jawad testified about the sleep-deprivation program at a war crimes hearing); Sutton, supra
note 31 (same).
158. Transcript of Record, supra note 106, at 594–605.
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[T]he accused was subjected to the “frequent flyer” program and
moved from cell to cell 112 times from 7 May 2004 to 20 May 2004,
on average of about once every three hours. The accused was
shackled and unshackled as he was moved from cell to cell. . . . [T]he
159
scheme was calculated to profoundly disrupt his mental senses.

Judge Henley found it unnecessary to rule that Jawad had been
160
tortured, but he came very close: “This Commission finds that,
under the circumstances, subjecting this accused to the ‘frequent
flyer’ program from May 7–20, 2004 constitutes abusive conduct and
161
cruel and inhuman treatment.” It is a “grave breach” of the Geneva
Conventions to submit a detainee—a protected person—to “inhuman
162
treatment.” Under the U.S. War Crimes Act, a “war crime” is “any
conduct . . . defined as a grave breach in any of the [Geneva
163
Conventions].” Thus, in essence, Judge Henley found that U.S.
personnel had committed a war crime. He recommended that “those
responsible should face appropriate disciplinary action” for this
164
“flagrant misbehavior.”
Although Judge Henley did not dismiss the charges, his ruling
was still significant in several respects. First, Judge Henley ruled that
165
he had the power to dismiss the charges. That he seriously
considered doing so had far-reaching implications, opening the door
for other detainees to seek dismissal of their military commission
charges on the basis of abuse. For those who suffered abuse and

159. United States v. Jawad, 1 M.C. 334, 334 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
Sept. 24, 2008) (ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—Torture of the Detainee (D-008)). This
echoes language from the U.S. antitorture statute, which defines torture, in part, as “procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B) (2006).
160. “[T]he narrow issue before this Military Commission is whether dismissal of the
charges against this accused is appropriate . . . . Answering this question does not require the
Military Commission to decide as fact that this accused was tortured.” Jawad, 1 M.C. at 336.
161. Id.
162. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (defining
“[g]rave breaches” to include “torture or inhuman treatment”); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (same); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 (same); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (same).
163. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
164. Jawad, 1 M.C. at 336.
165. “It is beyond peradventure that a military commission may dismiss charges because of
abusive treatment of the accused.” Id.
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torture far worse than that inflicted on Jawad, such as the so-called
166
high-value detainees, dismissal of charges suddenly became a real
possibility. The viability of such a motion also strengthened these
detainees’ attorneys’ claims of a right to discovery of all the various
forms of mistreatment to which their clients were subjected. The
ruling also helped to disprove one of the most misleading assertions
of the Bush administration—that harsh treatment of detainees was
only officially sanctioned for use against detainees believed to possess
critical intelligence. As Judge Henley succinctly stated, “[B]y March
2004 the accused was of no intelligence value to any government
agency. The infliction of the ‘frequent flyer’ technique upon the
167
accused thus had no legitimate interrogation purpose.”
168
Yet, according to the Joint Detention Operations Group
intelligence officer who actually ran the program, the frequent flyer
program was standard operating procedure—“a routine that was in
our daily synchronization matrix” that was vetted by camp leadership
including Joint Task Force Commander General Jay Hood and the
169
Joint Detention Operations Group’s Commander. The revelations
about the frequent flyer program also proved that prior investigations
into detainee treatment at Guantánamo had failed to uncover the
extent of abuses there. Indeed, Jawad’s frequent flyer treatment
commenced just hours after Navy Vice Admiral Albert T. Church III
170
visited the island to investigate the treatment of detainees. Church
reported that there was no evidence of systemic, ongoing abuse at
171
Guantánamo. Another high-level investigation asserted, based on

166. See The Guantánamo Docket: High Value, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo/detainees/high-value (last visited Jan. 16, 2010) (“Sixteen men in Guantánamo
have been described as ‘high-value detainees’ by United States officials.”).
167. Jawad, 1 M.C. at 335. Jawad’s interrogation records revealed that he was not
interrogated during the frequent flyer program or for several months thereafter. The officer
responsible for administering the frequent flyer program confirmed that the regime was not
related to intelligence gathering, but rather was part of an “incentive program” to encourage
compliant behavior from the detainees. See Barrett, supra note 32 (reporting that Army Major
Jason Orlich described the purpose of the frequent flyer program as “promot[ing] good
behavior”).
168. The Joint Detention Operations Group was responsible for the day-to-day running of
the Guantánamo detention facilities.
169. Transcript of Record, supra note 106, at 451–53, 466.
170. News Transcript, Dep’t of Def., Media Availability with Vice Admiral Church (May 12,
2004), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3002; Donald Rumsfeld,
Sec’y of Def., Pentagon Press Briefing (CNN television broadcast May 4, 2004).
171. Admiral Church visited Guantánamo on the orders of Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld as part of the initial crisis response to the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal. He later
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interviews with the commander of the prison complex, that the
172
frequent flyer program had been discontinued in March 2004. But
the officer who testified in Jawad’s pretrial hearing stated that dozens
of detainees had been subjected to the regime and that the program
173
continued until at least April 2005. The Washington Post confirmed
that Jawad was one of many detainees subjected to the program after
174
it was supposed to have ceased.
The lack of accountability for the intentional violations of human
rights by senior Bush administration officials is another problem that
175
has angered human rights and civil liberties advocates
and
176
undermined U.S. credibility and prestige internationally. The Jawad
case highlighted the unwillingness of both the Bush and Obama
administrations to investigate and punish detainee abuse. Confronted
with the undeniable evidence, in the government’s own documents, of
abuse of a Guantánamo detainee, I complied with my mandatory
reporting obligation and in May 2008 filed with the DOD an official
law of armed conflict violation report relating to the frequent flyer
program. I followed up multiple times to inquire if an investigation
was underway, as required by DOD regulations. In one follow-up
email, I attached a copy of Judge Henley’s ruling, highlighting his
conducted a comprehensive review of DOD interrogation operations, the result of which was
known as The Church Report. This comprehensive report reiterated his initial findings from his
May 2004 visit. See Josh White & R. Jeffrey Smith, Abuse Review Exonerates Policy: Low-Level
Leaders and Confusion Blamed, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16 (“Church’s review,
according to officials familiar with it, sheds little new light on what has been a year of high-level
investigations . . . .”).
172. SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 150, at 11 (“Organizational response: None. Current
JTF-GTMO Commander terminated the frequent flyer cell movement program upon his arrival
in March 04.”).
173. Transcript of Record, supra note 106, at 451–52.
174. White, supra note 152.
175. See, e.g., The Rutherford Inst., Human Rights, Faith-Based and Justice Groups Urge
Obama to Establish Presidential Torture Commission, RIGHT SIDE NEWS (Apr. 28, 2009,
15:49), http://www.rightsidenews.com/200904284559/editorial/us-opinion-and-editorial/humanrights-faith-based-and-justice-groups-urge-obama-to-establish-torture-commission.html (“The
Rutherford Institute has joined with a coalition of 18 other human rights, faith-based, and
justice organizations to urge President Obama to appoint a commission to investigate torture
sanctioned by the Bush administration.”).
176. EMINENT JURISTS PANEL ON TERRORISM, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ASSESSING DAMAGE, URGING ACTION 159 (2009) (noting
the “harmful results of intemperate responses to the threat of terrorism”); Colum Lynch, U.S.
Policies Criticized by U.N. Rights Watchdog, WASH. POST, June 25, 2009, at A11 (“The United
Nations’ top human rights advocate . . . said officials who authorized the use of ‘torture’ must be
held accountable. . . . She also called for a probe of officials involved in the Bush
administration’s harsh interrogation program.”).
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recommendation that the persons responsible be held accountable.
Even press accounts documenting the DOD’s refusal to investigate
177
my report failed to generate an investigation.
The abuse of Mohammed Jawad not only affected his case and
others in the military commissions, but also reverberated outside the
legal arena. Another controversial aspect of detainee operations and
interrogation practices during the Bush era was the involvement of
medical personnel in interrogations, particularly psychologists
assigned to Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCT).
Officially, these mental health professionals participated in
interrogations only to ensure they were “safe, legal, ethical, and
178
effective,” but documents that surfaced in the Jawad case suggested
179
otherwise. One document revealed the involvement of a BSCT
psychologist in the interrogations of Jawad and strongly suggested
that she had been directly responsible for some of the abuses that he
experienced and that led to his suicide attempt in December 2003. I
attempted to call this Army psychologist as a witness, but the
prosecution informed me that the officer had invoked her right
against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The revelation of the
BSCT’s involvement in detainee abuse and the psychologist’s
apparent concern that she could potentially be accused of criminal
behavior directly affected an ongoing national debate in the
psychology profession about the participation of psychologists in
180
interrogations.
Just days after the hearing, the American
177. See Daphne Eviatar, Documents Suggest DOD Failed to Probe Alleged War Crimes,
WASH. INDEP. (Sept. 25, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://washingtonindependent.com/60833/documentssuggest-detainee-abuses-by-defense-department; Eric Umansky, Pentagon Investigating Gitmo
Abuse? Who Knows, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 29, 2008, 5:39 PM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/pentagon-investigating-gitmo-abuse-who-knows-1029. As of this writing, I have never
been contacted by anyone in DOD about the report.
178. Memorandum from Dep’t of Defense to Joint Intelligence Grp. & Joint Task Force–
Guantanamo, Operational Policy Memorandum #14, Behavioral Science Consultation Team
(BSCT) (Dec. 10, 2004), available at http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamotestimonials-project/testimonies/testimonies-of-standard-operating-procedures/bsct_sop_2004.pdf.
179. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPERIMENTS IN TORTURE: EVIDENCE OF
HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION IN THE “ENHANCED” INTERROGATION
PROGRAM 7–10 (2010) (describing the role of health professionals in designing and monitoring
torture activities).
180. Joseph Goldstein, Psychologists Are Split Over Gitmo, N.Y. SUN, Aug. 15, 2008, at 1
(discussing the debate over whether military psychologists should be prohibited from
contributing to the interrogation of the detainees); Editorial, Psychologists and Torture, BOS.
GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2008, at A16 (suggesting that the members of the American Psychological
Association (APA) should vote for officers and resolutions that oppose psychologist
participation in enhanced interrogation techniques).
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Psychological Association (APA) voted to amend its longstanding
policy and bar its members from participation in many military
181
interrogations. Leaders of the movement to change the APA policy
cited the publicity surrounding the Jawad case as an important
182
turning point in the debate.
D. Problems in the Prosecution
Two related problem that have plagued the Office of Military
183
and
Commissions are resignations of military prosecutors
allegations of improper meddling and bias by senior military and
184
civilian officials. Both problems arose in Jawad’s case.
Overall, seven prosecutors have resigned from the Office of
Military Commissions Prosecution, citing various ethical concerns and
185
problems with the fairness of the proceedings. Two of these
resignations, probably the highest profile of all, directly affected the
Jawad case. The first resignation to impact the Jawad case was that of
former Chief Prosecutor Air Force Colonel Morris Davis. Davis
tendered his resignation on October 4, 2007, over a dispute with
Convening Authority Susan Crawford, her legal advisor Air Force
Reserve Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann, and DOD General
Counsel William J. Haynes IV about the leadership of the

181. Benedict Carey, Psychologists Vote to End Interrogation Consultations, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2008, at A26 (reporting that the APA passed a referendum prohibiting psychologists
from consulting in the interrogations of detainees held in violation of international law or the
U.S. Constitution); Joseph Goldstein, Psychology Group Changes Policy on Interrogations, N.Y.
SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, at 6 (same); see also Dan Ephron, The Biscuit Breaker, NEWSWEEK, Oct.
27, 2008, at 49, 49–50 (profiling Steven Reisner, an APA presidential candidate and advocate of
prohibiting psychologists from participating in interrogations); Referendum on Torture: Debate
Over Role of Psychologists in Military Interrogations Comes to a Head at APA Annual
Convention, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 18, 2008), available at http://www.democracynow.org/
2008/8/18/referendum_on_torture_debate_over_role (previewing the APA’s vote on the
referendum).
182. See Ephron, supra note 181, at 50 (noting that Steven Reisner, a major opponent of
allowing psychologists to participate in interrogations, “says the Jawad case shows how
psychologists can stray into ethically complicated territory when they participate in
interrogations”).
183. Daniel Schulman, Is the Army Forcing Out a Gitmo Whistleblower?, MOTHER JONES
(May 31, 2010, 3:00 AM PDT), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/05/vandeveld-militarycommissions.
184. See, e.g., Scott Horton, The Great Guantánamo Puppet Theater, HARPER’S MAG., Feb.
21, 2008, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/02/hbc-90002460 (describing the role of politics in
the Guantánamo military trials); Ross Tuttle, Rigged Trials at Gitmo, NATION, Mar. 10, 2008, at
4, 4–6 (same).
185. Schulman, supra note 183.
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prosecution effort. A few weeks later, Davis explained the reasons for
his resignation in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times:
I was the chief prosecutor for the military commissions at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, until Oct. 4, the day I concluded that full,
fair and open trials were not possible under the current system. I
resigned on that day because I felt that the system had become
deeply politicized and that I could no longer do my job effectively or
186
responsibly.

In March 2008, shortly before I began my tour as a defense counsel,
in pretrial litigation in United States v. Hamdan, the defense had
sought relief for what they perceived to be unlawful influence exerted
by Crawford and Hartmann. Davis had testified for the defense about
what he believed to be improper interference with his professional
judgment by Crawford and Hartmann. Although declining to dismiss
the charges against Hamdan, Judge Allred did find that Hartmann
had exerted improper influence over the chief prosecutor and
generally had aligned himself too closely with the prosecution. He
187
therefore disqualified him from further participation in Hamdan.
Judge Allred cited several factors in his opinion that the legal advisor
had behaved improperly, including “[t]elling the Chief Prosecutor
(and other prosecutors) that certain types of cases would be tried, and
that others would not be tried” based on “political factors such as
whether they would capture the imagination of the American people,
188
be sexy, or involve blood on the hands of the accused.”
This opinion was released two days after my initial court
appearance with Jawad on May 7, 2008. I immediately sought to
interview Colonel Davis to find out if General Hartmann had exerted
any improper influence in the Jawad case. He told me that Jawad’s
was the very case to which Judge Allred had been referring—the case
that Hartmann believed would “capture the public’s imagination”

186. Morris Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at 15; see also Tuttle,
supra note 184, at 4 (“‘I said to him that if we come up short and there are some acquittals in
our cases, it will at least validate the process,’ Davis continued. ‘At which point, [Haynes’s] eyes
got wide and he said, ‘Wait a minute, we can’t have acquittals. If we’ve been holding these guys
for so long, how can we explain letting them get off? We can’t have acquittals. We’ve got to
have convictions.’ Davis submitted his resignation on October 4, 2007, just hours after he was
informed that Haynes had been put above him in the commissions’ chain of command.”)
187. United States v. Hamdan, 1 M.C. 78 (Military Comm’n Guantánamo Bay, Cuba May 9,
2008) (ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Unlawful Influence) (D-026)).
188. Id. at 89.
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because it was “sexy” and there was “blood on [the defendant’s]
189
hands.”
I filed an unlawful influence motion, seeking to have the charges
dismissed, or at least to have the Legal Advisor disqualified and a
190
new pretrial advice prepared. Testimony on the motion was
presented at the June 19 and August 13–14 hearings, including
testimony for the defense by Colonel Davis and Army Lieutenant
Colonel Will Britt, the acting chief prosecutor at the time the charges
against Jawad were filed. The testimony focused not only on
Hartmann’s efforts to pressure the chief prosecutor to charge Jawad,
191
but also on his abusive, bullying demeanor toward subordinates and
his “nano-management” of the prosecution—all while he was
supposed to be providing neutral and objective legal advice to the
Convening Authority. The hearings included the rare sight of one
192
general officer publicly criticizing another, generated significant
193
negative publicity for Hartmann and the commissions, and resulted
in Hartmann being partially disqualified from providing legal advice
194
in Jawad’s case.
Just when it looked like things could not get any worse for the
prosecution, the lead prosecutor, Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld
concluded that he could no longer ethically continue to prosecute

189. See Jane Sutton, Guantanamo Trials Put Generals at Odds, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2008,
6:49 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1337894520080813 (“Davis testified on
Wednesday that Jawad’s case ‘went from the freezer to the frying pan thanks to Gen.
Hartmann.’”).
190. Defense Motion to Dismiss for Unlawful Influence, supra note 19. The Motion,
Government Response, and Supplemental Motions can be found at http://www.defense.gov/
news/Jawad - D - 004 Motion to Dismiss Unlawful Influence 1.pdf. Under the MCA, no person
could attempt to influence the professional judgment of the Chief Prosecutor. 10 U.S.C. § 949b
(2006).
191. See Carol Rosenberg, General Accuses Counterpart of Bullying, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Aug. 14, 2008, available at Factiva, Doc. No. PPGZ000020080814e48e0006l
(“[S]ubordinates have described Hartmann’s style as abusive ‘nano-management’ . . . .”).
192. Id. Brigadier General Gregory Zanetti described General Hartmann as “abusive,
bullying and unprofessional, . . . pretty much across the board.” Id. (alteration in original).
193. See, e.g., Ross Tuttle, More Meddling at Gitmo, NATION (July 17, 2008),
http://www.thenation.com/article/more-meddling-gitmo (“Hartmann’s stance has ‘eroded the
independence of his own function and the independence of the Convening Authority’ . . . .”).
194. Melia, Pentagon Official Removed, supra note 32; Sutton, supra note 32. After General
Hartmann was disqualified from a third case, United States v. Khadr, he was finally removed
from his position as legal advisor. See Andy Worthington, The Dark Heart of Guantanamo,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 2, 2008, 10:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andyworthington/the-dark-heart-of-guantan_b_131188.html
(describing
Hartmann’s
tenure,
disqualifications, and promotion).
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Jawad, and he requested reassignment to other duties. Although
Vandeveld hoped to resign quietly and without fanfare, when I
requested that he testify about the reasons for his resignation, he
196
agreed. His stinging criticism of the prosecution —and of the
military commissions generally—generated a firestorm of
197
controversy and created an enormous perception problem for the
chief prosecutor, who responded with a smear campaign against
198
Vandeveld.
Vandeveld was involved in six active military
commission cases at the time. In an effort at damage control, the
charges in five of the cases—all but Jawad’s case—were ordered
199
withdrawn. Vandeveld later became one of the most effective and
200
outspoken critics of the military commissions. He testified before
201
and, more
Congress about problems with the commissions,
importantly to Jawad, submitted a powerful sworn declaration in
support of his habeas corpus petition, which included the following:
It is my opinion, based on my extensive knowledge of the case, that
there is no credible evidence or legal basis to justify Mr. Jawad’s

195. Stacy Sullivan, Confessions of a Former Guantánamo Prosecutor, SALON (Oct. 23,
2008, 7:19 AM ET), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/10/23/vandeveld. Other media
outlets also reported that Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld quit. E.g., William Glaberson,
Guantánamo Prosecutor Is Quitting in Dispute Over a Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A20.
196. Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld, supra note 117, at 2–4.
197. See Melia, Former Gitmo Prosecutor Blasts Tribunals, supra note 33 (describing
Vandeveld’s comments and the military’s response); Josh Meyer, For Lawyer, Trial Was
Tribulation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A1 (same).
198. Ross Tuttle, Smearing Colonel Vandeveld, NATION (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.
thenation.com/article/smearing-colonel-vandeveld; Schulman, supra note 183.
199. William Glaberson, U.S. Drops War Crimes Charges for 5 Guantánamo Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, at A1; Eric Umansky, Gitmo Dismissals Don’t Include One of Most
Problematic Cases, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 22, 2008, 11:50 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/
gitmo-dismissals-dont-include-one-of-most-problematic-cases-1022.
200. Darrel J. Vandeveld, I Was Slow to Recognize the Stain of Guantanamo, WASH. POST
(Jan. 18, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/14/AR2009011
402319.html?sid=ST2009011402450 (“Now that I’m home in Erie, far removed from
Guantanamo, I have regained my sense of self. I am ashamed that it took me so long to
recognize the stain of Guantanamo, not simply on America’s standing in the world, but as part,
now, of a history we cannot undo.”); Sullivan, supra note 195 (“In what may be an effort to
prevent Vandeveld from testifying for the defense—and possibly providing additional damning
information about the government’s conduct at Guantánamo—the Pentagon on Tuesday
announced that it was dropping charges against five of the detainees whose cases Vandeveld
was working on.”).
201. Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 16 (2009) (statement of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel J. Vandeveld, Former
Prosecutor, Guantánamo Bay Military Commissions).
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detention in U.S. custody or his prosecution by military commission.
There is, however, reliable evidence that he was badly mistreated by
U.S. authorities both in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo, and he has
suffered, and continues to suffer, great psychological harm. Holding
Mr. Jawad’s [sic] for over six years, with no resolution of his case
and with no terminus in sight, is something beyond a travesty.
....
. . . I personally do not believe there is any lawful basis for
continuing to detain Mr. Jawad. There is no reliable evidence of any
202
voluntary involvement on Jawad’s part with any terrorist groups.

When Vandeveld testified before Congress, he went even further,
203
stating that Jawad was “very likely innocent of any wrongdoing.”
E. Innocence
That Jawad was not a terrorist and that he was very likely
innocent of any wrongdoing made his case extremely troubling. These
circumstances also made him typical—the perfect representative of
Guantánamo. In hindsight, we now know with certainty that the
majority of the 774 detainees held at Guantánamo were wrongly
imprisoned. Few detainees had even fought against the United States;
204
fewer still were terrorists or had committed war crimes. Despite the
hyperbole of then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the
detainees represented “the worst of the worst,” a significant majority
205
of the detainees had no strong connection with al Qaeda, and even
202. Declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Darrel Vandeveld at 1, 14, Al Halmandy v. Obama,
No. 05-cv-02385 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2009).
203. Legal Issues Surrounding the Military Commissions System, supra note 201, at 22
(statement of Lieutenant Colonel Vandeveld).
204. See MARK DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 2 (2006), available at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf
(“Fifty-five percent (55%) of the detainees are not determined to have committed any hostile
acts against the United States or its coalition allies. . . . Only 8% of the detainees were
characterized as al Qaeda fighters. Of the remaining detainees, 40% have no definitive
connection with al Qaeda at all and 18% . . . have no definitive affiliation with either al Qaeda
or the Taliban.”); see also Carol Rosenberg, Review: Most Guantánamo Detainees Should Be
Released, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 29, 2010, at A7 (“A yearlong review of evidence against men
who are being held as terrorism suspects at Guantánamo has concluded that most of them
should be released or transferred to third countries.”).
205. Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats And Responses: The Detainees; Some Guantanamo
Prisoners Will Be Freed, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at A14; see also DENBEAUX,
supra note 204, at 2.
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fewer had any provable role in any terrorist attack, a conclusion that
some officials of the Bush administration have now publicly
acknowledged. For example, according to Colonel Lawrence
Wilkinson, former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell,
[T]he U.S. leadership became aware . . . very early on . . . that many
of the detainees were innocent of any substantial wrongdoing, had
little intelligence value, and should be immediately released.
But to have admitted this reality would have been a black mark on
their leadership from virtually day one of the so-called Global War
on Terror and these leaders already had black marks enough . . . .
They were not about to admit to their further errors at Guantanamo
Bay. Better to claim that everyone there was a hardcore terrorist,
was of enduring intelligence value, and would return to jihad if
206
released.

In a sworn declaration submitted in habeas corpus litigation,
Wilkinson expanded on this point:
[I]t became apparent to me as early as August 2002 . . . that many of
the prisoners detained at Guantánamo had been taken into custody
without regard to whether they were truly enemy combatants, or in
207
fact whether many of them were enemies at all.
208

The numbers support Wilkinson’s assertions. Two-thirds of the
detainees were actually released by the Bush administration with
scores more cleared for release and awaiting countries willing to
209
resettle them at the time President Obama assumed office. Many

206. Lawrence Wilkerson, Some Truths About Guantanamo Bay, WASH. NOTE (Mar. 17,
2009, 7:27 PM), http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2009/03/some_truths_abo; see also
Andrew O. Selsky, Ex-Bush Official: Many Gitmo Detainees Innocent, S.F. GATE (Mar. 20,
2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-03-20/news/17215507_1_guantanamo-detainees-combatants
(“Many detainees locked up at Guantanamo were innocent men swept up by U.S. forces unable
to distinguish enemies from noncombatants, a former Bush administration official said
Thursday.”).
207. Declaration of Col. Lawrence Wilkerson at 4, In re Petitioners Seeking Habeas Corpus
Relief in Relation to Prior Detentions at Guantánamo Bay, 700 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2010)
(CV 05-1009), available at http://www.truthout.org/files/Wilkerson.pdf.
208. See supra note 204.
209. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (“Over the past 7
years, approximately 800 individuals whom the Department of Defense has ever determined to
be, or treated as, enemy combatants have been detained at Guantánamo. The Federal
Government has moved more than 500 such detainees from Guantánamo, either by returning
them to their home country or by releasing or transferring them to a third country.”); President
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more have since been cleared for release. Of those detainees whom
the government asserted it had a lawful basis to detain, many have
sought relief through petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In thirtyseven of fifty-five cases (67 percent) to reach the merits in federal
210
court, the detainee prevailed.
After a year-long review of the remaining detainees by President
Obama’s Guantánamo Detainee Review Task Force, only thirty-six
detainees were determined to be viable candidates for prosecution or
prolonged detention, with forty-eight more deemed too dangerous to
211
release. Even assuming that there is a legitimate basis to prosecute
or detain these eighty-four men, this would indicate that only about
11 percent of the detainees to have passed through Guantánamo
actually were involved in any significant terrorist activities, with 89
percent posing little or no threat to the United States. In this respect,
Mohammed Jawad was typical. What was unusual about Jawad was
that, unlike most of the detainees at Guantánamo, he was actually
charged with a crime, and therefore had the chance to prove his
212
innocence in court.
CONCLUSION
The Jawad case epitomizes the worst excesses of the war on
terrorism—the wrongful imprisonment and torture of an innocent
teenager in a legal black hole, followed by his attempted prosecution
for an invented war crime using coerced confessions. But the case also
represents what is best about America. The Pentagon assigned, at
taxpayer expense, three military officers to defend him, and then
213
promoted two of us, despite our vigorous and outspoken criticism of
the government’s actions. Demonstrating the genius of our
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 123 (“Two-thirds of
the detainees were released before I took office and ordered the closure of Guantanamo.”).
210. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, GUANTANAMO HABEAS SCORECARD 1 (2010),
available at http://www.ccrjustice.org/files/2010-11-02 Habeas SCORECARD Website Version
.pdf.
211. GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT, at ii (2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
212. Fewer than thirty Guantánamo detainees have ever been charged with a crime before
the military commissions. See Commission Cases, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, http://www.
defense.gov/news/commissions.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2010) (listing twenty-four cases). Of
these, three have been convicted (Hicks, Hamdan, and al Bahlul), and three have had the
charges dropped and been released (Mohammed Jawad, Binyam Mohamed, and Fouad al
Rabia).
213. The third officer, Major Eric Montalvo, retired.

FRAKT IN FINAL.DOC

1410

3/2/2011 1:19:50 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1367

constitutional system of checks and balances, the Supreme Court
insisted on judicial review of executive branch detention decisions
even during wartime; in turn, this decision allowed one
unquestionably independent judge to give Jawad back his freedom
while giving the government the kind of tongue-lashing that would be
unthinkable in a less democratic society. Military prosecutors
jeopardized their personal advancement to expose the flaws in the
commissions and to ensure that Jawad was treated fairly. Many
214
people, including several Duke Law students, volunteered time or
215
resources to assist Jawad, helping to ensure that justice ultimately
prevailed.
Yet, despite the positive outcome for Jawad, the outlook for
other detainees remains, at best, uncertain. In this age of terrorism,
our nation’s commitment to the ideals of justice and due process
often seems to hang on the very slender thread of a bare majority on
the Supreme Court. Although it has promised (but failed) to close
Guantánamo and to restore the rule of law, the Obama
administration has shifted detention operations to facilities that it has
216
asserted are beyond judicial scrutiny. There is constant pressure by
elected officials of both parties to limit the rights of terrorism
suspects, while those who have fought valiantly to protect those
suspects’ rights are demonized by political extremists who challenge
217
their loyalty. Mohammed Jawad’s story highlights the need to

214. The Guantanamo Defense Clinic at Duke Law School provided expert research
assistance to the Jawad defense team.
215. Andy Worthington, The Unsung Heroes Who Helped Secure Mohammed Jawad’s
Release from Guantánamo, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.
commondreams.org/view/2009/09/21-7.
216. David G. Savage & Christi Parsons, Court Rules Bagram Prisoners Can’t Appeal Their
Detention, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at AA1.
217. See David J.R. Frakt, Lawfare and Counterlawfare: The Demonization of the Gitmo
Bar and Other Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming
Mar. 2011) (“The article analyzes several specific legal actions, including the efforts to discredit
and malign attorneys who represented Guantanamo detainees, which attacks have continued to
come from defenders of Bush-era policies.”); Steve Vladeck, The War on Lawyers,
Continued . . ., BALKINIZATION (May 25, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/05/
war-on-lawyers-continued.html (“[S]ection 1037 of the Act . . ., titled ‘Inspector General
Investigation of the Conduct and Practices of Lawyers Representing Individuals Detained at
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,’ instructs the Department of Defense IG to ‘conduct an
investigation of the conduct and practices of lawyers’ who represent clients at Guantánamo and
report back to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees within 90 days.”). See
generally David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1983
(2008) (“This Article is about government policies that have (intentionally or not) made it more
difficult for lawyers to provide legal representation to Guantánamo prisoners.”).
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continue the fight for robust due process and fair and humane
treatment for all detainees, and to remain ever vigilant about the
erosion of our core values under the guise of protecting national
security.

